Spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion: Theoretical foundations and empirical implications by Akamatsu, Takashi et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Spatial scale of agglomeration and
dispersion: Theoretical foundations and
empirical implications
Takashi Akamatsu and Tomoya Mori and Minoru Osawa and
Yuki Takayama
Tohoku University, Kyoto University, Kanazawa University
8 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83142/
MPRA Paper No. 83142, posted 5 December 2017 08:12 UTC
Spatial Scale of Agglomeration and Dispersion:
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Implications∗
Takashi Akamatsu†, Tomoya Mori‡ ,§, Minoru Osawa¶ and Yuki Takayama‖
December 4, 2017
Abstract
This paper studies the theoretical properties of existing economic geography models with
agglomeration and dispersion forces in a many-region setup, rather than their original two-
region space, to investigate the spatial scale—global or local—of agglomeration and dispersion
intrinsic to each model. We show that models in the literature reduce to two canonical
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies over the past few decades have led to the accumulation of ample evidence
that agglomeration externalities are the major source of the lumpy spatial distributions of
economic activities (see, e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, for a survey). A wide variety
of formal models have been proposed to investigate the underlying mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Duranton and Puga, 2004; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2015, for surveys). For analytical
tractability, most existing models rely on a location space that abstracts from the diversity
of interregional distances inherent in actual regional economies, where a typical approach
assumes a location space comprising just two regions.1 Summarizing the spatial eﬀects in a
single interregional distance simplifies the analysis. However, this benefit comes at the cost
of losing information on the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion.2
To see this, consider a model with any agglomeration force but without a dispersion
force. In such a model, all the mobile agents will concentrate in one region. If some
dispersion forces were added to the model, a proportion of mobile agents will deviate from
the concentration. In a two-region economy, there is only one alternative region to head for.
Hence, there is no variation in the spatial scale of dispersion. However, in a many-region
economy in which interregional distances are heterogeneous, the spatial scale of dispersion
can vary depending on the nature of the dispersion force. Dispersion may occur locally to
avoid crowding inside the agglomeration as in the case of an urban congestion externality,
or it may occur globally through attraction from outside the agglomeration in the case of a
distant, less crowded market.
This study revisits a wide variety of existing economic geographymodels in a many-region
setup with diverse interregional distances.3 By characterizing their bifurcation behaviors
behind the spontaneous formation of agglomerations, we show that these models reduce
to two canonical classes: (i) one with a global dispersion force4 and (ii) the other with a local
dispersion force.5 Formally, these two dispersion forces diﬀer in that the former is dependent,
1Another typical approach allows for the presence of many regions that are equidistant (often zero distance)
from one another as in the system of cities model proposed by Henderson (1974). See Tabuchi, Thisse and
Zeng (2005) for a recent such application.
2Many extant empirical studies have abstracted from the space between locations and focused on the local
interactions between agglomeration size and location-specific factors (see, e.g., Combes and Gobillon, 2015, for
a survey). The empirical studies discussed in Section 6 belong to the other strand of the literature that accounts
for global factors (e.g., interregional transport accessibility) on regional agglomerations.
3More specifically, we cover static many-region models with a single type of mobile agent (see footnotes
4, 5, and 6). We do not cover models with multiple types of mobile agents (e.g., urban models of Fujita and
Ogawa, 1982; Ota and Fujita, 1993; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm and Wolf, 2015;
Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2017), or dynamic models (e.g., Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009, 2014,
2015; Desmet, Nagy and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017; Nagy, 2017).
4For example, Krugman (1991); Puga (1999); Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002); Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003); Pflüger (2004); Harris and Wilson (1978).
5For example, Beckmann (1976); Mossay and Picard (2011); Blanchet, Mossay and Santambrogio (2016);
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whereas the latter is independent, on the distance structure of the model. The most realistic
formulations incorporate both forces, which we call class (iii).6 (See Table 1 in Section 4.3
for the classification of the existing models).
The basic two classes (i) and (ii) exhibit two stark diﬀerences. The first diﬀerence appears
in the response to transport costs. Global dispersion (i.e., an increase in the number of
agglomerations, a decrease in the spacing of agglomerations, and a decrease in the size of
each individual agglomeration) is triggeredby higher costs. By contrast, localdispersion (i.e., a
decrease in populationdensity ofmobile agents and an enlargement of the spatial extent of an
agglomeration) is triggered by lower costs. In class (iii) models with both types of dispersion
forces, a decrease in transport costs simultaneously causes both agglomeration at the global scale and
dispersion at the local scale. The second diﬀerence shows up in the agglomeration patterns.
In the former, multiple and distinct agglomerations emerge; in the latter, the agglomeration
always results in a unimodal regional distribution of mobile agents. The typical location
pattern can thus be described as locally concentrated and globally dispersed for the former and
as globally concentrated and locally dispersed for the latter.
The notion of the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion is not pervasive in the
empirical literature on regional agglomeration. However, it is indispensable to understand
the evolution of agglomeration patterns in reality. Consider the case of Japan since 1970.
The development of highways and high-speed railway networks in Japan was triggered
by the Tokyo Olympics held in 1964. Between 1970 and 2015, the total highway (high-
speed railway) length increased from 879 km (515 km) by more than 16 (10) times to 14,146
km (5,350 km). The 302 urban agglomerations that have survived throughout that 45-
year period experienced a 21% increase in population size on average (controlling for the
national population growth). This means that there was a selective concentration from across
the country, i.e., at the global scale.7, 8 However, this concentration at the global scale was
associated with a dispersion at the local scale: there was a 94% increase in areal size on average
with a 22% decrease in population density for individual agglomerations on average. These
seemingly paradoxical evolutions of urban agglomerations in Japan turn out to be a standard
outcome of class (iii) models (see Section 5.3).
Accordingly, our results provide novel perspectives for the three major strands of the em-
pirical literature on regional agglomeration. One is on the measure of agglomeration (e.g.,
Helpman (1998); Redding and Sturm (2008); Murata and Thisse (2005); Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
6For example, Tabuchi (1998); Pflüger and Südekum (2008); Takayama and Akamatsu (2011).
7Each urban agglomeration is identified as the set of contiguous 1 km-by-1 km cells with a population
density of at least 1000/km2 and total population of at least 10,000. Population count data are obtained
from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications of Japan (1970, 2015). The transport
network data are obtained from the National Land Numerical Information Download Service of Japan at
http://nlftp.mlit.go.jp/ksj-e/gml/gml_datalist.html. See Appendix A for more details.
8The population size of each agglomeration is computed in terms of its share of the national population,
and thus the growth in national population size is controlled for.
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Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and Overman, 2005; Brülhart and Traeger, 2005; Mori,
Nishikimi and Smith, 2005). The other two are on reduced-form regression approaches (see,
e.g., Redding and Turner, 2015, §20.4, for a survey) and structural model-based approaches
(see, e.g., Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, for a survey) to evaluate the impacts of exoge-
nous changes, particularly those of interregional transport access on regional agglomeration.
Here, we highlight the basic issue in each context.
A scalar index has long been the natural choice for measuring agglomeration, reflecting
that abstraction from interregional distances has been the rule in the formal analyses of
agglomeration. On the premise of our theoretical results, when the dispersion force is
eﬀective at both global and local scales as in reality, agglomeration proceeds at the global
scale when dispersion proceeds at the local scale and vice versa. Thus, the meaning of the
net eﬀect summarized by a scalar index is unclear. In Section 6.1, we argue for the necessity
and utility of more disaggregated measures of agglomeration.
For the reduced-form regression exercises, consider, for example, the contrasting studies
of regional agglomeration (i.e., at a global scale) presented by Duranton and Turner (2012)
and Faber (2014). The former focused on the growth of large metro areas in the United
States, while the latter focused on the growth of peripheral counties in China.9 The former
(latter) revealed a positive (negative) correlation between the size of agglomeration and
interregional transport access in a given region. In light of class (i) models, these opposite
responses may simply reflect diﬀerent sides of the same coin. That is, both the results may
indicate the tendency of agglomeration at the global scale (toward larger regions) under
the treatment, i.e., an improvement in interregional transport access (as in the case of Japan
discussed above). Thus, one must carefully interpret the estimated treatment eﬀect, since
it is simply an average eﬀect for the set of the selected regions, where the selection often
involves some obvious biases, e.g., a larger or smaller subset of all cities. For the excluded
but treated regions, the sign of the impacts may well be the opposite. Section 6.2 provides a
unified interpretation of a wider variety of empirical evidence on regional agglomeration in
terms of our theoretical results.
Finally, regarding structural model-based approaches for regional agglomeration, the
two representative models proposed by Redding and Sturm (2008) and Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) belong to class (ii), i.e., they cannot explain the endogenous formation of multiple
agglomerations by construction. In other words, their basic premise is that the primary
source of regional variation in agglomeration size is the heterogeneity in exogenous (or
first-nature) regional advantages and that agglomeration externalities play only a secondary
role. However, we demonstrate that even in this case, the comparative static outcome is still
9The amount of interregional highway linkages (e.g., number and total length) within a given region is often
interpreted as a measure of intra-urban transport infrastructure (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Duranton and Turner,
2012). However, we suggest that it can also be interpreted as ameasure of interregional transport infrastructure.
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governed by agglomeration externalities and is specific to the model class. In fact, the signs
of the treatment eﬀects on agglomeration typically reverse if multiple agglomerations are
allowed to form endogenously, i.e., class (i) models are adopted instead.10
The remainder of this paper is organizedas follows. Section 2develops ageneralmodeling
framework for analyzing agglomeration patterns in a many-region economy and defines the
equilibria and their stability. Section 3 characterizes the nature of the dispersion force and
provides a formal classification of the spatial patterns of agglomeration in terms of the spatial
scale of dispersion forces. Section 4 presents a mapping of existing models of economic
geography to the classification. Section 5 outlines the impact of changes in transport costs
on the stable equilibrium patterns of agglomeration under representative models. Section 6
discusses the implications of our theoretical results for the empirical literature on regional
agglomeration. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses future research agendas regarding
models with richer and more realistic structures that are not addressed in this study.
2 A general modeling framework for spatial agglomerations
This section introduces a generic format of many-region spatial economic models, which we
refer to as economic geography models, with agglomeration externalities and the endogenous
formation of spatial concentration. As essential preliminaries, the technical aspects (stability
and bifurcation of equilibria) and their economic interpretations are discussed.
2.1 Economic geography models
The economy compromises K discrete regions indexed from 0 as i  0, 1, . . . , K − 1, and
K ≡ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} denotes the set of regions. Throughout our analyses, the term “region”
indicates a discrete spatial unit in which a mobile agent can locate. Whether the model is
interpreted to be intra-urban, interregional, or international is not essential for our results.
A “region” may alternatively be termed an urban zone, a municipality, a country, and so
forth.11
There is a continuum of mobile agents of a single type; an agent chooses a single region
in which to locate. We denote the spatial distribution of agents by h ≡ (hi)i∈K , where its ith
element hi ≥ 0 is the mass of agents located in region i. The total mass of mobile agents is
exogenous constant H, i.e.,
∑
i∈K hi  H. Concretely, the set of all possible spatial patterns is
given byD ≡ {h ∈ RK | ∑k∈K hk  H, hk ≥ 0}.
10See the discussions in Section 6.3 and the formal analysis in Appendix D.
11On assuming a discrete space, also noted is that there are intrinsic diﬃculties with employing a continuous
space in empirical analyses because of the discrete nature of the data as well as numerical computations.
5
Given the spatial distribution h of agents, the payoﬀ of choosing each region is deter-
mined. The payoﬀ function is denoted by v(h) ≡ (vi(h))i∈K , where vi(h) denotes the payoﬀ
for an agent located in region i ∈ K . Agents are mobile and are free to choose their locations
to possibly improve their own payoﬀs. Thus, the equilibrium condition for the spatial dis-
tribution of agents is formulated as follows: v∗  vi(h) for all regions i such that hi > 0, and
v∗ ≥ vi(h) for any region i such that hi  0. Here, v∗ is the equilibrium payoﬀ level.
Our analysis thus adheres to the most canonical form of economic geography models:
static models with a single type of mobile agent. For example, the above description covers
models of endogenous city center formation (e.g., Beckmann, 1976). Notably, it also covers
single-industry new economic geography (NEG) models; in such models there is only a
single type of mobile agent, i.e., the location incentives of firms andworkers coincide. We do
not consider, however, more involved models with multiple types of mobile agents,12 sector-
wise diﬀerentiated spatial frictions,13 multiple types of increasing returns,14 and dynamic
models15. These directions are discussed in Section 7.
The indispensable feature of economic geography models is the presence of space: trans-
port costs are incurred by, e.g., the shipment of goods between diﬀerent regions or social
interactions among agents in diﬀerent locations. Therefore, there is a fundamental trade-
oﬀ between transport costs and scale economies associated with the spatial concentration of
economic activities (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). The payoﬀ functions of economic geography
models include agglomeration and dispersion forces, meaning that spatial equilibria are
determined by a tense balance of these two opposing forces that depend on the interregional
transport costs. We assume that the spatial friction between regions is summarized by a sin-
gle friction matrixD  [di j], where di j ∈ [0, 1) denotes the freeness of the transport between
regions i , j. Also, throughout the paper we focus on a special geographical setup, namely a
racetrack economy, which we will describe in detail in Section 3.1.
Given the friction matrix D that encapsulates the role of the underlying geography,
the microfoundations for the payoﬀ function v(h) are typically provided by modeling the
short-run equilibrium relating to the spatial frictions between locations. Assuming that the
relocation of agents is suﬃciently slow compared with that through market reactions, the
short-run equilibrium conditions (e.g., factor and product markets clearing and trade bal-
ance) determine the payoﬀ (utility or profit) in each region as a function of the spatial pattern
of agents h. We thus assume that the payoﬀ function v(h) includesD as a parameter.
12For example, the urbanmodels of Fujita andOgawa (1982); Ota and Fujita (1993); Lucas andRossi-Hansberg
(2002) as well as their recent applications, e.g., Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Owens et al. (2017).
13For example, Fujita and Krugman (1995) and Mori (1997).
14For example, Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999b); Tabuchi and Thisse (2011), and also Hsu (2012).
15Most notably, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009, 2014, 2015); Desmet et al. (2017); Nagy (2017).
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2.2 Stability and bifurcation of the equilibria
Owing to the positive externalities of spatial agglomeration, economic geography models
often face a multiplicity of equilibria. A standard approach in the literature is to introduce
equilibrium refinement based on local stability under myopic evolutionary dynamics, where
the rate of change in the number of residents hi in region i is modeled on the basis of the
spatial pattern of agents h and that of payoﬀ v(h).16 Wedenote the deterministic dynamic by
Ûh  F (h, v(h)), where the dot overh represents the time derivative. We assume (i)F satisfies
diﬀerentiabilitywith respect to both arguments inD, (ii) agents relocate in the direction of an
increased aggregate payoﬀ underF , and (iii) the total mass of agents is preserved underF .17
Furthermore, we assume that any spatial equilibrium is a rest point of the dynamic.18 Given
the adjustment dynamic F , the stability of the equilibrium is defined in terms of asymptotic
stability under F .
The stability of a given spatial equilibrium is parameter-dependent. As emphasized
by the NEG literature, changes in transportation technologies can trigger the endogenous
emergence of regional inequality. The basic core–periphery story following Krugman (1991)
is as follows: “Consider an economywith two regions that are ex-ante symmetric, where the
regions have exactly the same characteristics and mobile agents are uniformly distributed.
When interregional transport costs are high, the uniform distribution of mobile agents is
a stable equilibrium. If the transportation cost falls below a certain threshold value, the
pattern is no longer stable; the agglomeration toward one of the regions occurs, and the
core–periphery pattern emerges by self-organization.”
Although the intuitive story of the two-region economy backed by the rich interactions
of economic forces has its own right, corresponding many-region studies are scarce in the
literature. In particular,which spatial patterns emerge after an encountered destabilization in
a many-region economy is far from obvious. We therefore need better methods to examine
the stability of equilibrium patterns in a many-region economy.
Such an abrupt change in spatial patterns due to destabilization is an instance of bifurca-
tion. Thus, bifurcation theory in general provides the canonical tools to tackle our problem.
This study builds on the following formal facts on the stability and bifurcation of equilibria
to examine the formation of spatial patterns in a many-region economy:19
16Another approach is global stability analysis based on perfect foresight dynamics (Oyama, 2009a,b).
17For (i), we assume the diﬀerentiability of F (h, v(h)) as a whole on the tangent space of D. The second,
(ii), is called positive correlation (Sandholm, 2010), which is defined by
∑
i∈K vi(h) · Ûhi > 0 for all h ∈ D. The
last, (iii), requires that F (h, v(h)) live in the tangent cone ofD for all h ∈ D. Furthermore, although this study
focuses on homogeneous payoﬀs, one can analyze the stability of spatial equilibria with idiosyncratic taste
heterogeneity (e.g., Murata, 2003; Redding, 2016; Behrens, Mion, Murata and Südekum, 2017; Monte, Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2016) by using perturbed best response dynamics.
18That is, if h∗ is a spatial equilibrium, we have Ûh  F (h∗ , v(h∗))  0.
19In the rest of the paper, we sacrifice mathematical accuracy to reduce unnecessary burden for general
readers. For a rigorous and general textbook treatment of the stability analysis of dynamical systems and
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Fact 1. Consider a spatial equilibrium h∗. Let J ≡ [∂Fi(h∗, v(h∗))/∂h j] be the Jacobian
matrix of the dynamic F evaluated at h∗. Let the eigenvalues of J be g  (gk)k∈K .20
Then, h∗ is stable if all the K eigenvalues have strictly negative real parts; it is
unstable if any of the eigenvalues has a strictly positive real part.
Fact 2. Let h∗ be a stable spatial equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium at which every eigenvalue
of J(h∗) has strictly negative real parts. Suppose that any of the eigenvalues, say gk ,
switches its sign because of a change in the value of an underlyingmodel parameter.
Then, bifurcation occurs: h∗ becomes unstable and the spatial pattern moves in the
direction of ηk  (ηk ,i)i∈K , which is the eigenvector associated with gk ; given a real
number ϵ, a pattern that can be expressed as h∗ + ϵηk emerges.
Note that when we employ Fact 2, we can focus on ηk with
∑
i∈K ηk ,i  0 because we assume
that the total number of mobile agents is preserved under F .21
The two-region story is related toFacts 1 and2 in the followingway. Consider a two-region
economy that comprises two regions 0 and 1 with completely homogeneous characteristics.
The uniform pattern h¯ ≡ (h , h) is obviously a spatial equilibrium. The (two) eigenvectors
of J are given by η0  (1, 1) and η1  (1,−1) with the associated eigenvalues g0 and g1,
respectively. The former, η0, induces a change in the total mass of mobile agents and is
irrelevant in a closed economy. The latter, η1, expresses the agglomeration of mobile agents
toward one of the regions, say 0. The associated eigenvalue, g1, then coincides with the
diﬀerential of the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the two regions ∆v(h) ≡ v0(h) − v1(h) up to a
positive constant. If g1 < 0, then a marginal increase in the population share of region 0
induces a relative decrease in the payoﬀ in region 0. Hence, no mobile agent hopes to leave
region 1. If a decrease in transport costs changes the sign of g1 from negative to positive,
then relocation becomes strictly beneficial for agents in region 1, i.e., h¯ become unstable, and
agglomeration emerges.
2.3 Interpreting eigenvalues: Net agglomeration forces
From Facts 1 and 2, by analyzing the eigenpairs (i.e., eigenvalues g and eigenvectors {ηk}) of
J(h∗), one can examine when the destabilization of a given equilibrium h∗ occurs and which
spatial pattern(s) emerge thereafter. Although seemingly mechanical, as one would expect
from the above example of the two-region setup, g and {ηk} have rich economic meanings.
bifurcation theory, see, for example, Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) and Kuznetsov (2004). An earlier
attempt to apply bifurcation theory to spatial structural evolution can be found in Wilson (1981).
20Allowing notational abuse, K denotes the K-dimensional index sets for the regions and the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of J .
21To be precise, to examine the stability of a given (interior) equilibrium h∗, it suﬃces to analyze the eigen-
values of the restricted linear map J(h∗) : TD → TD, where TD ≡ {η ∈ RK | η · 1  0} is the tangent space of
D (see Appendix B.4).
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The sign of an eigenvalue gk dictates whetherh∗ is stable in the direction of the associated
eigenvector ηk . We provide some intuitions. Given an interior equilibrium h∗, consider a
small variation in the spatial pattern such that h  h∗ + ηk , where ηk ≡ (ηk ,i)i∈K is one of the
eigenvectors of J(h∗), whose associated eigenvalue is gk . Then, under our assumptions of
F , one can show that22
sgn[gk]  sgn[δV(ηk)], (2.1)
where δV(ηk) and δVi(ηk) are respectively defined by
δV(ηk) ≡
∑
i∈K
δVi(ηk)ηk ,i and δVi(ηk) ≡
∑
j∈K
∂vi(h∗)
∂h j
ηk , j . (2.2)
Note that ηk ,i  hi − h∗i is either positive or negative. Observe that δVi(ηk) is the marginal
increase in the payoﬀ in region iwhen the spatial pattern changes toh  h∗+ηk . Accordingly,
δV(ηk) is the weighted sum of the marginal increase in the payoﬀs across the regions.
If gk is strictly negative (positive), δV(ηk) is strictly negative (positive). This implies that if
gk < 0, the collateral deviation in the ηk direction is strictly undesirable for relocated agents.
To see this, rewrite δV(ηk) as follows:
δV(ηk) 
∑
ηk ,i>0
δVi(ηk)
ηk ,i  − ∑
ηk ,i<0
δVi(ηk)
ηk ,i  . (2.3)
The first (second) term on the right-hand side is the average payoﬀ increase in the destination
(origin) regions of migration; thus, the weighted sum δV(ηk) is the net increase in the payoﬀ
experienced by relocated agents. If all {gk} are strictly negative, for any direction there is
no incentive to relocate and thus the equilibrium is stable. It is also intuitive to consider a
single hypothetical agent who may want to relocate from region i to j; his or her payoﬀ gain
is given by δV  δVj − δVi . If all {gk} are strictly negative, it follows that δV < 0 and there is
no incentive for such a relocation. Conversely, if any of {gk} is positive, a collateral deviation
in the ηk direction is beneficial for all relocated agents and a snowball eﬀect will kick the
spatial pattern out of the equilibrium; that is, the equilibrium is unstable.
In the context of economic geographymodels, one can interpret each eigenvalue gk as the
net force in its associated direction of deviation ηk in the sense that gk reflects the net eﬀect of
the agglomeration and dispersion forces at work in the ηk direction. Depending on its sign,
gk expresses the net agglomeration force (if positive) or the net dispersion force (if negative).
In particular, if only one of them happens to be positive, then the spatial pattern is unstable
22See Appendix B.4. The discussion here assumes that gk and ηk are both real, as this property holds true
throughout our analyses below.
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Figure 1: A racetrack economy (K  16)
Note: The thin lines represent the transportation network and the black points represent the discrete
regions in which mobile agents can be located. The regions are sequentially numbered.
and agglomeration occurs in the direction of the associated eigenvector.
3 Spatial scale of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion
Although the general facts on the local stability and bifurcation of equilibria are in principle
applicable to any situation in general geographical setups (i.e., the assumed structures ofD),
the analytical results are diﬃcult to obtain; thus, formal implications are limited. This section
introduces aminimal and ideal geographical setup, namely a racetrack economy that consider-
ably simplifies the local stability analysis of spatial equilibria in general economic geography
models. Despite the technical simplification, the setup preserves the heterogeneities in in-
terregional distances—an indispensable feature to express the spatial scale of agglomeration
and dispersion patterns. By employing the desirable properties of the geographical setup, we
reveal the two distinct spatial scales of the dispersion force that determine the spatial pattern
of agglomerations. Concrete examples are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Racetrack economy: Desired testbed
We assume a racetrack economy à la Krugman (1993) (Figure 1).23 The K regions are equidis-
tantly spread in a circle and sequentially numbered from zero, with transportation possible
only around the circumference. The circumferential length is normalized to unity. Further-
more, we assume that there are no region-fixed advantages in terms of, for instance, local
amenities or productivity diﬀerences. The geographical setup provides an ideal testbed to
analyze the intrinsic properties of amany-region economic geographymodel for two reasons.
23Our approach to local stability analysis that uses a racetrack economy was developed by Akamatsu,
Takayama and Ikeda (2012), and an application can be found in Osawa, Akamatsu and Takayama (2017); see
Appendix B for a summary. As the approach focuses on local bifurcations from a given equilibrium, group-
theoretic bifurcation theory combined with numerical analysis provide complementary insights into the global
bifurcation behavior of equilibria. See Ikeda, Akamatsu and Kono (2012); Ikeda, Murota, Akamatsu, Kono and
Takayama (2014); Ikeda, Murota and Takayama (2017a), as well as Ikeda and Murota (2014).
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First, it allows us to isolate the role of endogenous forces accruing from externalities and
increasing returns in the determination of spatial patterns of agglomeration. In particular,
it abstracts from the location-fixed advantages induced by the shape of the underlying trans-
portation network. For instance, in a long narrow economy (e.g., Solow and Vickrey, 1971;
Beckmann, 1976), the regions near the boundaries have fewer opportunities to access the
other regions; the central portion is advantageous because of the shape of space. In our
setup, by contrast, every region has the same level of accessibility to the other regions.24
Second, despite its simplicity, the setup incorporates heterogeneities in interregional
distances. Let ℓi j denote the shortest path length from region i to j on the circumference;
then, we have for example ℓ0,1  ℓ1,0  1/K and ℓK−1,1  ℓ1,K−1  2/K.25 The heterogeneity
in interregional distances makes the relative location in space matter, which is not the case
for the common two-region setup. Furthermore, the symmetric racetrack economy reduces
to the two-region setup if K  2; the former is thus a natural generalization of the latter.
In addition, in linewith Krugman (1993), we assume that the spatial friction between each
pair of regions takes Samuelson’s iceberg form, a standard choice for general equilibrium
models.26 In concrete terms, di j is given by di j  exp[−τℓi j] with a transport technology
parameter τ ∈ (0,∞). D is thus symmetric because ℓi j  ℓ ji . Moreover, each di j is decreasing
in τ. When we consider a steady improvement in transportation technology—that is, a
continued decrease in τ—the spatial frictions between the regions gradually vanish (di j → 1
for all i and j as τ → 0).
3.2 Local and global forces and the basic roles of space
The first virtue of assuming a racetrack structure is that the uniform distribution is always an
equilibrium when the payoﬀ function is symmetric across the regions. For this reason, one
can follow extant theories that assume the spatial distribution of mobile agents to be initially
uniform and study the endogenous formation of spatial patterns due to pure economic
forces. We denote the flat-earth equilibrium on the racetrack by h¯ ≡ (h , h , . . . , h)with h ≡ H/K.
Furthermore, it is typical that at the flat-earth equilibrium, J and ∇v(h¯) ≡ [∂vi(h¯)/∂h j] are
closely related. If we let ek(τ) be the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯), we often have gk(τ)  cek(τ)with
a positive constant c.27 Thus, not only the sign but also the magnitude of gk(τ) matters—in
24In this sense, our setup has an intrinsic complementarity with the many-region analyses by Matsuyama
(1999), who abstracted from endogenous positive feedbacks and focused on the role of geography itself.
25In concrete terms, ℓi j  min
{|i − j |, K − |i − j |}.
26Some models, e.g., those by Ottaviano et al. (2002), Tabuchi et al. (2005), and Picard and Tabuchi (2013),
have assumed non-iceberg transport technology. In principle, our analytical approach is eﬀective with respect
to these models, albeit the analysis is far more tedious compared with the iceberg case; the models can be
fit to either class (i) or (ii) [or (iii)] discussed in Section 1 and introduced below. We refrain from analyzing
non-iceberg models to simplify our presentation.
27For instance, the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) satisfies c  h (see Appendix B.4).
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Figure 2: Eigenvalues of the friction matrixD for a racetrack economy with K  16
Note: Every fk(τ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K is an increasing function of τ. Those for 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 are shown in
the figure, because we have fk(τ)  fK−k(τ) for K/2+ 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. In addition, for each given level
of τ, fk(τ) is basically decreasing in k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 (see Appendix B).
fact, the relative magnitude of gk(τ) represents that of the agglomeration and dispersion
forces in the ηk direction.
The second andmost important utility of imposing a racetrack structure is that the role of
transport costs in the net agglomeration force becomes transparent. To see this, the notion of
the spatial scales of agglomeration and dispersion forces is useful. Throughout this paper, we
call an agglomeration or dispersion force global if it depends on the distance between regions
(i.e., the friction structure D), while a force that does not depend on the distance between
regions is termed a local agglomeration or dispersion force.
Below, we consider a toy model that reveals the intrinsic workings of a global force.
Consider the following simplest reduced-form payoﬀ specification that implements only a
black-box positive externality of agglomeration but no dispersion force:
v(h) Dh, (3.1)
or, in the element-wise form, vi(h)  ∑ j∈K di jh j . This simple model is a canonical example
of models with a global agglomeration force—an agglomeration force that depends on interre-
gional distances. This payoﬀ function implies that each mobile agent wants to be as close
as possible to the other agents as in Beckmann (1976), and that there is no counteracting
force to prevent them to cluster. A straightforward intuition suggests that all mobile agents
agglomerate in one region in equilibrium. This intuition helps us associate the agglomera-
tion/dispersion force with the distance structure of the economy, i.e., the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors ofD as explained below. It is evident that we have ∇v(h)  D at the flat-earth
equilibrium.
The net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)}, or the eigenvalues of J , are thus given by gk(τ) 
hd(τ) fk(τ) with { fk(τ)} being the eigenvalues of the row-normalized version of the friction
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Panel A: η1 (monocentric)
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Panel B: η2 (duocentric)
η3,i
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Panel C: η3 (tricentric)
ηK/2,i
0
Panel D: ηK/2 (alternative agglomeration)
Figure 3: Illustrations of the eigenvectors ηk (K  16; k  1, 2, 3, K/2)
Note: The negative (positive) elements of an eigenvector ηk indicate that if the flat-earth pattern is
perturbed into the direction, so that the new spatial pattern is h  h¯ + ϵηk with ϵ > 0, such regions
experience a decrease (increase) in their population.
matrix D¯ ≡ D/d(τ), where d(τ)  ∑ j∈K di j(τ) > 0 is the row sum of D.28 In a racetrack
economy, we have analytical expressions of the eigenvalues { fk(τ)} as well as those of their
associated eigenvectors {ηk} (see Appendix B). Consequently, the eigenvectors of J are
also given by {ηk}. The eigenvector associated with gk(τ) is ηk  (ηk ,i)  (cos[θki]) with
θ ≡ 2pi/K; we ignore g0 in the following because η0  (1, 1, . . . , 1) violates the conservation
of the total mass of agents.
Figure 2 illustrates { fk(τ)}k≥1 for K  16. Each fk(τ) ranges from 0 to 1 and decreases
if τ decreases. When interregional transport costs decline, the eﬀects of the friction matrix
vanish. Thus, we see that gk(τ) > 0 for all k ≥ 1, and hence h¯ is never stable (Fact 1). Because
no dispersion force can stabilize the flat-earth equilibrium, it is also natural that h¯ is unstable
for any value of τ.
The relative magnitude of the net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)} is of interest. To this end,
for the toy model, one can see that fk(τ) determines the relative strength between {gk(τ)}.
Note that fk(τ) is decreasing in k (see Figure 2), with the maximal f1(τ) for all τ. Thus, the
maximal among gk(τ) is also g1(τ). But why does this occur?
Looking at the eigenvectors {ηk} provides intuitions. Some examples of ηk with K  16
are illustrated in Figure 3 for k  1, 2, 3, K/2.29 The negative (positive) element ηk ,i in ηk
indicates that if the spatial pattern slightly changed in the ηk direction so that h  h¯ + ϵηk
28We assume the replicator dynamic as the underlying dynamic F for illustration purposes (see Example B.3
in Appendix B.4). Note also that the row sum ofD is row-independent in a racetrack economy.
29To simplify the presentation, we assume that the number of regions K is a multiple of four. Qualitatively,
the exact number of regions is inconsequential if it is suﬃciently large.
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with ϵ > 0, the number of mobile agents decreases (increases) in the region. In a symmetric
racetrack economy, the possible directions of change are characterized by the number of
peaks, k, or, in other words, by the number of population concentrations (i.e., agglomerations).
η1 (Panel A of Figure 3) is directed to a monopolar pattern with a single peak and hence
expresses the emergence of a global concentration of mobile agents; η2 (Panel B) expresses
the emergence of two major concentrations, while η3 (Panel C) expresses the emergence of
three major concentrations; ηK/2 (Panel D) expresses the emergence of the smallest possible
agglomerations. In other words, η1 immediately pushes the flat-earth equilibrium toward a
unimodal agglomeration, while η2, η3, and ηK/2 (as well as the other ηk except for η1) pushes
the flat-earth equilibrium toward the other multimodal patterns. As we assume a featureless
space, the peaks are equidistantly spaced.
Given the knowledge of {ηk}, the maximality of g1(τ) now has clear economic meaning.
We understand that the associated eigenvector η1 for g1(τ) is a unimodal, monocentric
agglomeration (Panel B of Figure 3). Since there are no negative eﬀects of agglomeration in
the model, a monocentric concentration is the most beneficial outcome for every agent. As
the number of peaks in ηk increases, the size of a single agglomeration falls. This obviously
reduces the magnitude of the positive externalities and is less favorable. Moreover, fk(τ)
decreases as τ decreases because when the level of interregional transport costs is low, there
is less incentive for agglomeration.
3.3 Endogenous formation of agglomeration out of uniformity
For canonical economic geography models in the literature, at the flat-earth equilibrium, J
is related to the row-normalized version of the friction matrix, D¯(τ), in the following form
(see Appendices B and C):30
J ≃ ∇v(h¯) ≃ G(D¯(τ)), (3.2)
where the function G(D¯) is defined by G(D¯) ≡ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with model-dependent
(positive or negative) coeﬃcients c0, c1, and c2. Consequently, in pallalel with (3.2), the kth
(k , 0) eigenvalue gk(τ) of J satisfies (see Appendix B)
sgn[gk(τ)]  sgn[ek(τ)]  sgn
[
G
(
fk(τ)
) ]
, (3.3)
30The notation ≃ for the matrices means that the left-hand side coincides with the right-hand side multiplied
by some real, symmetric, and circulant matrix J0, which is positive definite relative to TD. For our purpose in
this study (i.e., the local stability analysis of h¯), we can practically “ignore” J0 in our discussion. Also noted is
that the convention is just to simplify the presentation.
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where ek(τ) and fk(τ) are the kth eigenvalue of ∇v(h¯) and D¯(τ), respectively, and the k-
independent function G( f ) is defined by
G
(
f
)
 c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2 (3.4)
in linewithG(D¯). The eigenvector associatedwith each gk(τ) is again ηk  (ηk ,i)  (cos[θki])
with θ ≡ 2pi/K (Figure 3). Recall that one can ignore g0 provided that the underlying
dynamic F preserves the total mass of mobile agents.
By employing our definition of local and global forces, we see that c0 summarizes the
local agglomeration and dispersion forces in the model and that c1 and c2 summarize the
global ones. Usually, we have c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0. For example, a crowding-
out eﬀect inside a region due to congestion or point-wise scarcity of land produces a local
dispersion force, resulting in a negative constant term (c0 < 0); a global social interaction
(e.g., Beckmann, 1976) is suggested by a positive first-order term (c1 > 0); and goods demand
from spatially dispersed consumers in other regions (e.g., Krugman, 1991) is indicated by a
negative second-order term (c2 < 0).31
In the following, we assume the most general case of G( f ) in the literature: G( f ) is given
by G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2 with c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0, with two roots f ∗ and f ∗∗ for
G( f )  0 in (0, 1) such that f ∗∗ < f ∗. The shape of G( f ) under these assumptions is shown in
the bottom left panel of Figure 4. The functional form of G( f ) corresponds to a model with
a local dispersion force, global agglomeration force, and global dispersion force.
The properties of { fk(τ)} are completely model-independent; because { fk(τ)} are merely
the eigenvalues of the (normalized version of the) friction matrix D¯(τ), they are invariant
regardless of the economic geographymodel (i.e., the payoﬀ function v(h)) onemay assume.
Instead, the function G( f ) in (3.4), or equivalently the matrix relation (3.2), encapsulates
the net eﬀects of the economic interactions in the model and provides insights into the
endogenous formation of spatial patterns.
The question posed is as follows: given such G( f ), which spatial pattern emerges after
an encountered bifurcation? In particular, will it be a unimodal pattern or amultipolar pattern?
Choose an appropriate value of τ so that h¯ is stable; that is, the net agglomeration forces
{gk(τ)} are strictly negative, meaning that any deviation is strictly non-beneficial. Consider
a gradual change in τ. When any of the net agglomeration forces becomes positive, the flat-
earth equilibrium stops being stable and agglomerations emerge. What one should observe
here is the first gk(τ) that changes its sign from negative to positive. Let τ⋆ be the critical
value at which this occurs. It is evident that τ⋆, or the so-called break point, is a solution
to the equation maxk∈K
{
gk(τ⋆)
}
 0. Denote the index of the critical eigenvalue such that
31In Appendix C, we present detailed analyses of how economic geography models are mapped to the
coeﬃcients {ci} by taking the models in the literature as concrete examples.
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Figure 4: Net agglomeration forces and their model-dependent and -independent components
Note: Top: The net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)}. We consider the simplest case: gk(τ)  G( fk(τ)).
Bottom left: An example of the model-dependent function G( f ). Bottom right: The eigenvalues
{ fk(τ)} of D¯, which are model-independent. h¯ is stable in the dark gray regions of τ or f .
gk(τ⋆)  maxk gk(τ⋆) by kcrit⋆ . Then, the spatial pattern at τ⋆ is expressed in terms of the
kcrit⋆ th eigenvector as h  h¯+ ϵηkcrit⋆ , where ϵ is a real number. Under our assumption of G( f ),
the curves of {gk(τ)} behave as in the top panel of Figure 4; the upper envelope of the curves
represents maxk∈K
{
gk(τ⋆)
}
, and the critical points are found where the curve crosses the
horizontal axis. There are two solutions, τ∗ and τ∗∗, and we have kcrit∗  K/2 and kcrit∗∗  1.
See Figure 5 for the spatial patterns that emerge at τ∗ (Panel A) and τ∗∗ (Panel B).
The stability of the flat-earth equilibrium for the higher level of τ is attributed to the
global dispersion force, while that for the lower level of τ is attributed to the local dispersion
force. As transport costs decline from a high level, the flat-earth equilibrium collapses at
τ∗ because the global dispersion force declines (recall that fk(τ) decreases as τ decreases).
When τ decreases below another threshold, τ∗∗, it brings about a situation where the flat-
earth equilibrium becomes stable again because the local dispersion force, which always
exists regardless of τ, overcomes the agglomeration force.
3.4 Rethinking redispersion
Panels A and B of Figure 5 illustrate the two mutually distinct spatial patterns that emerge
at τ∗ and τ∗∗, respectively. Panel A illustrates the spatial pattern that emerges at τ∗, which is
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Panel A: h¯ + ϵηK/2 Panel B: h¯ + ϵη1
Figure 5: Schematic illustrations of the spatial patterns at τ∗ and τ∗∗ (K  16)
Note: The size of the small white circle represents the number of mobile agents in the region. Panel
A: bifurcation at τ∗ (a locally concentrated and globally dispersed pattern); Panel B: bifurcation at
τ∗∗ (a globally concentrated and locally dispersed pattern).
interpreted as a locally concentrated and globally dispersed pattern. This is characterized by the
formation of many small agglomerations spread around the circumference. In the pattern,
mobile agents are locally concentrated, whereas the agglomerations are equidistantly spaced
or globally dispersed.32 Panel B illustrates the pattern at τ∗∗, which is interpreted as a globally
concentrated and locally dispersed pattern. In this pattern, agents are globally concentrated to
shape a unimodal distribution (a single agglomeration with a large spatial extent).
The two critical points τ∗ and τ∗∗ are customarily termed in the literature the “emergence
of core and periphery” and “redispersion (revival of the periphery),” respectively, and the
process as a whole is denoted “bell-shaped development” (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). When
transport costs are very high (τ > τ∗), the symmetric equilibrium is stable. In the first stage
of the decline in transport costs, the destabilization of the symmetric equilibrium results in
spatial inequality. In the later stage, once established, agglomeration is no longer sustainable
and the symmetric configuration is stable again (τ < τ∗∗).
The redispersion process is simply considered to be the reverse process of agglomeration.
For any model with a single type of mobile agent, it is supposed that there is no essential
diﬀerence in the spatial patterns in the two stages (around τ∗ and τ∗∗).33 Indeed, this is true
in the two-region setup where the two relevant eigenvectors coincide: ηK/2  η1  (1,−1).
However, our analysis so far has shown that it is not the case in a many-region economy.
The two bifurcations at τ∗ and τ∗∗ are of a distinct nature: each represents the emergence of
mutually distinct spatial patterns and is attributed to dispersion forces at diﬀerent spatial
scales (i.e., global and local).
32Observe that the spatial pattern resembles those obtained by the numerical simulations presented by
Krugman (1993) for K  12. The spatial pattern is also similar to the pre-assumed spatial patterns in Tabuchi
and Thisse (2011).
33Takatsuka and Zeng (2009) analyzed redispersion behavior in a two-region economy, NEG model with
multiple industries and distinct returns to scale, and found asymmetry in the two processes, namely that the
industrial composition in each region is diﬀerent in the redispersion phase.
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Figure 6: G( f ) for the models proposed by Krugman (1991) and Harris and Wilson (1978)
4 Classification of models by the spatial scale of dispersion
The distinction between global and local dispersion forces allows us to reduce economic
geography models to two canonical classes: (i) those with only a global dispersion force
and (ii) those with only a local dispersion force. This section provides concrete examples of
global and local dispersion forces by employing selected models in the literature. For every
model discussed in this section, J is shown to have up to the second-order term of D¯ as
in (3.2), meaning that G( f ) is (at most) a quadratic of f as in (3.4). Table 1 is the resultant
classification. Detailed analyses of the models in the table are relegated to Appendix C.
4.1 Class (i): Models with a global dispersion force
Global dispersion forces are those that arise outside a given agglomeration, typically imple-
mented as spatially dispersed demand. A global dispersion force usually appears in J as a
negative (second-order) term with respect toD. For instance, the NEG models proposed by
Krugman (1991), Puga (1999), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), and Pflüger (2004) satisfy c0  0
and we have G( f )  c1 f + c2 f 2 with c1 > 0 and c2 < 0. Furthermore, the model proposed by
Harris and Wilson (1978), a classical model of spatial self-organization proposed in the field
of geography, satisfies G( f )  c0 + c2 f 2 with c0 > 0 and c2 < 0.34
Figure 6 illustrates G( f ) for Krugman (1991) and Harris andWilson (1978). Because G( f )
is a concave quadratic with G(0) ≥ 0, G( f ) has at most a single solution f ∗ in (0, 1); this
implies that a single critical value (break point) of transport costs τ∗ can exist.35 As discussed
in the previous section, at τ∗, the emergent pattern is locally concentrated and globally dispersed
(or amultimodalpattern) inwhichmultiple distinct agglomerations are endogenously formed
34For the drawn cases, the underlying parameters satisfy the so-called “no-blackhole condition” that ensures
the stability of the flat-earth pattern in the higher extreme of τ. Otherwise, we have G(1) > 0 and the flat-earth
pattern is always unstable.
35We can show that the influential model of Ottaviano et al. (2002) also endogenously produces globally
dispersedpatterns; hence, this is a class (i)model. As themodel assumesnon-iceberg transportation technology,
we do not discuss it here to simplify our presentation (see also Footnote 26).
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(Panel A of Figure 5).
The seminal model of Krugman (1991) is an example. Appendix C provides the omitted
derivations of the indirect utility function and other formulae of this model as well as the
results under the other models discussed below. The payoﬀ function (i.e., indirect utility
function of mobile workers) is given by
vi(h)  wiP−µi (4.1)
where wi denotes the nominal wage of mobile workers and
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
h jw1−σj d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(4.2)
denotes the price index in region i. The parameters µ and σ are the expenditure share of
the manufactured good and elasticity of substitution between the varieties, respectively. The
wage is obtained as the (unique) solution to the so-called wage equation that reflects the
short-run utility maximization of consumers, trade balance, and zero-profit condition for
firms. In each region, there is an exogenous endowment of immobile workers.
For the model, one has
J ≃ µ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ −
(
µ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯2. (4.3)
The exact mappings to the coeﬃcients c1 > 0 and c2 < 0 are thus given by c1  µ(κ¯ + κ) and
c2  −(µ2κ¯ + κ), where we let κ¯ ≡ 1/(σ − 1) and κ ≡ 1/σ. The coeﬃcients c1 and c2 capture
the net eﬀects of the agglomeration and dispersion forces in the Krugman (1991) model,
respectively. In particular, µκ¯ in c1 represents the so-called price-index eﬀect, whereas µκ
represents a home-market eﬀect. On the contrary, c2 is the market-crowding eﬀect: µ2κ¯ in
c2 is due to firms’ competition over demand from mobile agents and in κ is due to that from
immobile agents. For more detailed discussions on the interpretations of the coeﬃcients, see
Remark C.2 in Appendix C.1.
4.2 Class (ii): Models with a local dispersion force
A local dispersion force acts inside each region and does not explicitly depend on the spatial
distribution of mobile agents. The urban costs induced within each region (e.g., housing
costs, congestion externalities) are typical. Examples include the frameworks of Helpman
(1998), Redding and Sturm (2008), and Murata and Thisse (2005) as well as the perfectly
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Figure 7: G( f ) for the models proposed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Helpman (1998)
competitive framework of Allen and Arkolakis (2014).36 Furthermore, the model proposed
by Beckmann (1976) focusing on the internal structure of cities (Mossay and Picard, 2011;
Blanchet et al., 2016) is another representative example.37 At the flat-earth pattern, a local
dispersion force appears in J as a negative constant term with respect toD (i.e., c0 < 0).
Figure 7 illustrates G( f ) for the models proposed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and
Helpman (1998). For these models, there exists at most a single critical point of f ∗∗. If the
model parameters are set such that there is an endogenous formation of agglomeration, the
flat-earth equilibrium is stable for the lower level of transport costs. At the only bifurcation
point τ∗∗, a globally concentrated and locally dispersed pattern (or a unimodalpattern)with a single
agglomeration is endogenously formed (Panel B of Figure 5). In this class of models, without
location-fixed factors, the only possible spatial pattern associated with agglomeration is a
globally concentrated and locally dispersed pattern.
The model proposed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) is a recent example. The indirect
utility function of mobile workers is given by
vi(h)  hβi wiP−1i , (4.4)
where Pi denotes the price index for the model
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
hα(σ−1)j w
1−σ
j d ji
)1/(1−σ)
. (4.5)
The parameters α > 0 and β < 0 are the exponents of a reduced-formMarshallian externality
36Without exogenous location-fixed factors, the model of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) (§3) is equiv-
alent to that of Redding and Sturm (2008). The model of Monte et al. (2016) also belongs to class (ii), albeit it
adds an extra urban cost as well as taste heterogeneity; we note that an idiosyncratic utility shock is equivalent
to a local dispersion force (see Appendix B for a brief discussion). It is also evident that Picard and Tabuchi
(2013) is a class (ii) model.
37We here consider a discrete-space version of the Beckmann model as formulated in Akamatsu, Fujishima
and Takayama (2017). Akamatsu et al. (2017) showed that a discrete-space version of the model asymptotically
converges to the continuous variant as the number of regions increases.
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and a local congestion externality in amenities, respectively, and wi(h) is the market wage
in region i. For this model, the source of agglomeration is the reduced-form local positive
externality represented by the parameter α. One has
J ≃ −(α + β − γ0)I + (α + β + γ1)D¯, (4.6)
with γ0 ≡ (1+ α)/σ and γ1 ≡ (1− β)/σ. We thus have G( f )  c0 + c1 f with c0  −(α+ β− γ0)
and c1  α + β + γ1. If α + β ≤ 0, there is no agglomeration force and the flat-earth equilibrium
is stable for any value of τ. If α + β > 0, there is a local positive agglomeration force; we
have c0 < 0 and c1 > 0 as well as G(1) > 0. If the agglomeration force is strong (0 < α + β),
the model can express endogenous agglomeration. In the net form, as indicated in (4.6),
the model does not have any global dispersion force. Thus, we conclude that the model
produces only unimodal patterns. In fact, Figure VIII in Allen and Arkolakis (2014) confirms
this result. In other contexts, the model presented by Beckmann (1976) (Mossay and Picard,
2011; Blanchet et al., 2016; Akamatsu et al., 2017) yields a similar linear functional form of
G( f ) since it incorporates a first-order global agglomeration force and a local dispersion
force.
As discussed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), their model is isomorphic to the Helpman
(1998) model with local landownership (i.e., Redding and Sturm, 2008). One can show that
the assumptions concerning landownershipdonot alter the above conclusion. ForHelpman’s
original model, with public landownership, under appropriate normalizations, one obtains
J ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2, so that G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2 with c0  −(1 − µ), c1  µ(κ¯ + κ), and
c2  −(κ+µ2κ¯)+ (1−µ). Again, κ¯  1/(σ− 1) and κ  1/σ, where µ is the expenditure share
of manufactured goods and σ is the elasticity of substitution between manufactured goods.
We have c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0; for themodel, the agglomeration force is derived from the
second term in J , whereas dispersion forces are derived from the others. Observe that c1 is
as per the model proposed by Krugman (1991), meaning that the agglomeration force of the
latter is isomorphic to that of the former. Panel B of Figure 7 illustrates the shape of G( f ) for
themodel. It follows thatwhenever there is an endogenous agglomeration, we haveG(1) > 0;
thus, f ∗ does not exist. Although c2 < 0 and there seemingly exists a global dispersion force,
it is not eﬀective. The main dispersion force of the model is therefore derived from the
consumption of non-tradable housing stocks that produces a negative pecuniary externality
through the local housing market.
4.3 Classification of representative economic geography models
Table 1 classifies representative economic geography models in the literature according to
the nature of their dispersion forces and resulting stable spatial patterns (including our toy
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model discussed in Section 3.2). The exact mapping to the coeﬃcients of G( f ) is provided
by Table 2 at the end of Appendix C. As discussed, at the flat-earth equilibrium of a given
model, one can characterize the fundamental tradeoﬀ between the centripetal and centrifugal
forces by the coeﬃcients {ci} or the shape of G( f ). In particular, one can clearly distinguish
the spatial scale of the model’s eﬀective dispersion force.
There are two canonical model classes, (i) and (ii). The former includes models with
only a global dispersion force, while the latter includes models with only a local dispersion
force. The second column of Table 1 summarizes the characteristic spatial patterns for
both of these model classes. Although our analysis concerns the endogenous formation of
spatial patterns under a multiplicity of equilibria, class (i) and (ii) models have qualitatively
diﬀerent behavior and can yield mutually contradicting implications when employed for
counterfactual exercises. This point is discussed in Section 6.3, and a formal analysis is
provided in Appendix D.
In addition, a few models in the literature have the two dispersion forces eﬀectively
at work. For instance, Tabuchi (1998), Pflüger and Südekum (2008), and Takayama and
Akamatsu (2011) presented both local and global dispersion forces. We refer to these as class
(iii) models. Such models produce spatial patterns with mixed characteristics of global and
local dispersion, whichwe discuss below by employing a numerical example. For this model
class, G( f ) is a concave quadratic that has two roots in the (0, 1) interval as in the bottom left
panel of Figure 4. As discussed in Section 3, the flat-earth equilibrium is stable for both high
and low transport costs.
Notably, our classification seems to be backed by a more general principle. A large body
of studies outside economics focus on the formation of spatial patterns, typically on the basis
of reaction–diﬀusion systems (Kondo and Miura, 2010). In that literature, it is now widely
accepted that the basic requirement to formmultiple peaks in stationary spatial patterns (i.e.,
in our context, stable locally concentrated and globally dispersed patterns) is a short-range
positive feedback combined with a long-range negative feedback with respect to a concentration of
mobile factors (Meinhardt and Gierer, 2000). Note that the negative term (global dispersion
force) of D¯ in J can be interpreted as a long-range negative feedback.
5 Numerical examples
In the many-region setup, the first bifurcation, or the emergence of agglomeration, may
not be the end of the story. The overall evolutionary path of the spatial structure in line
with a monotonic change (e.g., decline) in transport costs is of interest. Fortunately, the
intrinsic properties of the whole evolutionary process of the agglomeration patterns can be
qualitatively predicted by the above results on the stability of the flat-earth pattern. This
22
Table 1: Classification of economic geography models in the literature
Dispersion force Spatial patterns Economic geography models
None
Concentration
to a single region
(unimodal patterns)
The toy model defined by (3.1)
Only global
[class (i)]
Locally concentrated
and globally dispersed
(multimodal patterns)
Krugman (1991)
Puga (1999)
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)
Pflüger (2004)
Harris and Wilson (1978)
Only local
[class (ii)]
Globally concentrated
and locally dispersed
(unimodal patterns)
Helpman (1998)
Murata and Thisse (2005)
Redding and Sturm (2008)
Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) (§3)
Beckmann (1976)
Mossay and Picard (2011)
Blanchet et al. (2016)
Both
[class (iii)]
Mixed characteristics
of the classes (i) and (ii)
(multimodal patterns)
Tabuchi (1998)
Pflüger and Südekum (2008)
Takayama and Akamatsu (2011)
Note: Appendix C provides detailed analyses of the models, with Table 2 summarizing the exact
mappings of each model to the coeﬃcients of the corresponding model-dependent function G( f ) 
c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2.
section provides some numerical illustrations. The models of Krugman (1991), Helpman
(1998), and Pflüger and Südekum (2008) are chosen as representative examples of models
with only a global dispersion force [class (i)], those with only a local dispersion force [class
(ii)], and those with both dispersion forces [class (iii)], respectively. The numerical examples
in this section are conducted in an eight-region (K  8) symmetric racetrack economy.
Following the literature, the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) is employed as the
underlying dynamic F . The chosen parameters are described in Appendix C.
5.1 Class (i): Models with a global dispersion force
Figure 8 reports the evolutionary path of stable equilibrium patterns in the course of de-
creasing τ for the Krugman (1991) model. The black solid (dashed) curves depict the stable
(unstable) equilibrium values of population share λ  (λi) at each τ, where λi ≡ hi/H.
Consider a gradual decrease in τ from a suﬃciently high level at which the flat-earth equi-
librium is stable. The uniform distribution with no agglomerations is initially stable until
τ reaches the break point τ∗. As discussed in the previous section, the bifurcation at τ∗
pushes the spatial pattern in the direction of ηK/2  (1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1). This results in
the formation of a globally dispersed pattern with four disjoint and equidistantly separated
23
10.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3
τ
λi
τ∗∗∗ τ∗∗ τ∗
Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram of a class (i) model
Note: Krugman (1991) is taken as the underlying example model.
point-wise agglomerations.
A further decrease in τ triggers the second and third bifurcations at τ∗∗ and τ∗∗∗, respec-
tively.38 Observe that the bifurcations at τ∗∗ and τ∗∗∗ sequentially double the spacing between
agglomerated regions, reducing their number as 4 → 2 → 1. At the lower extreme of τ,
a monopolar pattern emerges. Note that each agglomeration has no spatial extent at any
level of transportation cost, since the local dispersion force is absent. In the model, better
interregional access (a smaller τ) enlarges the size of each agglomeration. Such an eﬀect is,
however, limited to the selected regions. Depending on the stage of the spatial structural
evolution, the impact of an improvement in transportation on the size of each agglomeration
can be either positive (for the selected regions) or negative (for the others). In this sense,
there are no monotonic relationships between the level of transport costs and size of each
agglomeration. In fact, this point is already apparent in two-region models that explicitly
incorporate agglomeration economies combined with interregional distance.
In our many-region setup, however, there comes another indeterminacy. As the spatial
structure evolves, selected regions may decline to form the hinterland of the currently selected
ones—the agglomeration shadow.39 Consider, as an example, the fourth region at the six o’clock
position in Figure 8. The region is selected at the transitions at τ∗ and τ∗∗, meaning that the
impact of a decrease in τ is positive. After τ∗∗∗ is encountered, however, it immediately loses
its population. For the region, a monotonic decrease in τ implies a win situation followed
by a lose situation. This indicates that if the empirical realities resemble this class of model,
whether the impact of a further decline in transport costs on a specific region is positive or
negative is indeterminate even when a monotonic relation for the region is supported by historical
38In fact, one can analytically derive these critical values at τ∗∗ and τ∗∗∗ (see Akamatsu et al., 2012; Osawa et
al., 2017) and characterize the spatial patterns that emerge at these points.
39The concept of the agglomeration shadow was first introduced by Arthur (1994) and it is formalized in the
context of the general equilibrium model of Fujita and Krugman (1995).
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram of a class (ii) model
Note: Allen and Arkolakis (2014) is taken as the underlying example model.
data. At least in a symmetric racetrack economy, we do not have any clear implication for
models in this class regarding the impact of a uniform reduction in transport costs on the
population (or output) size of an individual region since whether the population share of a
region grows or declines is in principle indeterminate a priori. Instead, possible predictions
focus on the global spatial distribution of agglomerations, namely the number of concentrations
and spacing between them, which monotonically decreases and increases, respectively.
5.2 Class (ii): Models with a local dispersion force
Figure 9 is similar to Figure 8 for the model proposed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014). This
model incorporates only a local dispersion force; the flat-earth equilibrium is stable for lower
values of τ. At τ∗∗ in Figure 7, bifurcation in the direction of η1 leads to the emergence of a
unimodal pattern. This is the bifurcation in the model; after the emergence of the unimodal
pattern at τ∗∗, when τ increases further, the spatial pattern monotonically and smoothly
converges to a monopolar pattern (i.e., the complete concentration of mobile agents at a
single region) as τ approaches infinity. Thus, if we define the number of agglomerations for
the model by that of the peaks (i.e., local maxima) in h, it is at most one. The model does not
allow locally concentrated and globally dispersed patterns to emerge; such models would
be interpreted as expressing the evolution of the spatial extent of a single agglomeration.
Quantitative spatial models that employ class (ii) models (e.g., Redding and Sturm, 2008;
Allen and Arkolakis, 2014) emphasize the uniqueness of the equilibrium, through which
calibrations and counterfactual analyses have determinate implications. These studies are
conducted under parameter settings that ensure the uniqueness of the equilibrium regardless
of the level of interregional transport costs (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). This is
made possible because the local dispersion force in class (ii) models does not depend on the
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Figure 10: Classification of the uniqueness and stability of the equilibria for the Allen and Arkolakis
(2014)
Note: We let α  0.6 and σ  4 for illustration purposes. h¯ is stable in the dark gray region, while
not in the light gray region. At τ∗∗ such that g1(τ∗∗)  0, a unimodal pattern emerges. α + β ≤ 0
is a suﬃcient condition for the stability of h¯ regardless of τ. A comparison with Figure I of Allen
and Arkolakis (2014), where their classification corresponds to Ranges I, II, and III above, would be
interesting.
level of accessibility to the other regions; consequently, if a suﬃciently strong local dispersion
force is imposed, no endogenous agglomeration is caused under any level of transport costs.
Notably, in our setup, since the uniformdistribution ofmobile agents across regions is always
an equilibrium on a symmetric racetrack, the uniqueness of the equilibrium automatically
implies that the flat-earth pattern h¯ is the only equilibrium and is stable. Figure 10 indicates
our classification of possible spatial patterns and their stability for the model proposed
by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) in a racetrack economy with arbitrary K. Their uniqueness
condition is β ≤ −α (i.e., Range III in the figure).40 This uniqueness directly implies that the
uniform distribution is stable regardless of the level of τ.
5.3 Class (iii): Models with both dispersion forces
Tabuchi (1998), Pflüger and Südekum (2008), and Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) consid-
ered both local and global dispersion forces. In eﬀect, these models exhibit the rich and
meaningful interplay between the number and spacing of agglomerations and spatial extent of
each agglomerationwithout any location-fixed factors but only with pure economic forces.
In these models, the evolutionary process of spatial agglomeration patterns in the course
of a monotonic change in τ is expected to be a combination of the two examples presented
above. This is indeed the case. Figure 11 depicts the evolution of the number of agglomera-
tions in the course of decreasing τ for the model proposed by Pflüger and Südekum (2008) in
40For themodel ofHelpman (1998), the condition for theuniqueness of the equilibrium is givenby (1−µ)σ > 1.
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Figure 11: Evolution of the number of agglomerations in a class (iii) model
Note: Pflüger and Südekum (2008) is taken as the underlying example model.
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Figure 12: Evolution of the spatial pattern in Figure 11
Note: The alphabets below the spatial patterns correspond to those in Figure 11.
a symmetric eight-region racetrack economy. We define the number of agglomerations in a
spatial distribution of mobile agents, h, by that of the local maxima therein.41 By comparing
Figure 11with Figure 8 and Figure 9, we observe that the former is basically a combination of
the latter two, as expected. When τ gradually decreases from a very high level, the number
of agglomerations evolves as 0 → 4 → 2 → 1 as in the class (i) models (Figure 8), while in
the later stage 1 → 0 as per the class (ii) models (Figure 9).42 The initial stage is governed
41For example, for Pattern I in Figure 12, we evenly split the population of the region in the middle of the
two peaks. Further, if two consecutive regions have the same population as in Pattern K in Figure 12, this is
counted as a single agglomeration.
42At this point, there is good reason to suspect that although seemingly identical, the flat-earth patterns
at the higher and lower levels of τ are distinct in nature. Specifically, one would argue that the number of
agglomerationsmust be eight (one), instead of zero, at large (low) τ. We refrain from these arguments, however,
because the two stages of dispersion are indistinguishable by the mere observation of h.
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by a decline in the global dispersion force, while the later stage is governed by a relative rise
in the local dispersion force. As the importance of distance declines given improvements
in transportation access, local congestion overcomes the agglomeration force and so-called
redispersion occurs.
The evolution of the spatial patterns provides richer intuitions. Figure 12 illustrates the
spatial patterns associated with Figure 11 (see also Section 3.2 to understand the figure).
The flat-earth pattern is initially stable (Pattern A); the first bifurcation leads to a four-centric
global dispersion (C), whereas the dispersion associated with the second bifurcation is two-
centric (E). These transitions are wholly in line with those of Krugman (1991); they are
governed by the gradual decline in the global dispersion force in the model. After these
transitions, the evolutionary behavior becomes more interesting; the decline in the global
dispersion force increases the relative importance of the local dispersion force. The two-
centric agglomerations formed in (E) gradually increase their spatial extent (F, G) because of
the local dispersion eﬀects combined with the relative decline in the global agglomeration
force. A further decline in τ implies a triumph of the global agglomeration force against
the global dispersion force since the latter declines faster than the former. Consequently,
the two agglomerations gradually merge (H, I) to form a monopolar agglomeration (J, K),
while maintaining their spatial extent due to the strong local dispersion force. As the relative
importance of the local dispersion force increases further, a gradual expansion of the single
agglomeration occurs (L, M) followed by complete redispersion (N). This rich and intuitive
interplay of the global and local scales of agglomeration and dispersion can be studied only
in many-region setups.
6 Implications for empirical studies
In the previous sections, we argued that the consideration of the diversity in interregional
distances is the key factor to explaining the actual spatial pattern of agglomeration. The
theoretical understanding of agglomeration and dispersion mechanisms at diﬀerent spatial
scales helps us find an appropriate way to quantify the spatial patterns of agglomeration,
which in turn allows us to properly formulate regression as well as structural models to
identify the causal mechanisms of regional agglomeration. This section highlights these
points by reviewing selected empirical studies of the relation between transport costs and
regional agglomerations.
6.1 Measures of agglomeration
One strand of the literature concerns the measurement of industrial agglomeration. Unlike
population agglomerations that havebeen identified in termsofdistinctmetropolitan areas or
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population clusters (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Rozenfeld, Rybski,
Gabaix and Makse, 2011), industrial agglomerations have typically been measured by using
an aggregated scalar index (e.g., Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and Overman, 2005;
Brülhart and Traeger, 2005; Mori et al., 2005).
Of the two pioneering indices of industrial agglomeration, that proposed by Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) intended to control for the spatial concentration of employment that accrued
from the distribution of employment among establishments, while the other presented by
Duranton and Overman (2005) aimed to resolve the spatial aggregation biases that arose
from regional data by using geo-coded microdata on establishments.
While these refinements may be reasonable in certain contexts, a major reservation about
these scalar indices is that by construction they do not distinguish spatial scales of agglom-
eration and dispersion. With respect to cross-sectional comparisons among industries, this
means that there is no way to distinguish spatial scales at which variations in the index
value arise, even though the underlying agglomeration mechanisms qualitatively diﬀer at
each scale.43 Another consequence of the abstraction from spatial scales is that these indices
inevitably neutralize the opposing responses of agglomeration at global and local scales to a
given change in transport costs.
Distinguishing individual agglomerations on a map as in the case of population agglom-
erations is necessary to separate the eﬀects at diﬀerent spatial scales. Kerr and Kominers
(2015) and Mori and Smith (2014) proposed clustering methods designed for economic ag-
glomerations. Pelleg and Moore (2000), Ishioka (2000), and Brendan and Dueck (2007)
proposed heuristic clustering techniques for general purposes. Our theory suggests that
agglomeration at the global scale is reflected in a smaller number of agglomerations (as well
as a larger spacing between them), whereas that at the local scale is reflected in a smaller
spatial extent of each individual agglomeration. These spatial properties of agglomeration
can be quantified by using the identified clusters.
An advantage of such a clustering approach for industrial agglomerations is that unlike
the case of population agglomeration, one can obtain variations in agglomeration patterns
across industries. By using the clustering method proposed by Mori and Smith (2014), Mori
and Smith (2015) indicated a wide variation in the degrees of agglomeration at both global
and local scales across three-digit manufacturing industries in Japan. The variations across
industries in turn can be used to test the theoretical implications of the spatial patterns of
agglomeration, for example, the causal relation among the number, size, and spatial extent
of agglomerations and transport costs. One such application by Mori, Mun and Sakaguchi
43Duranton and Overman (2005) distinguish distances between establishments; however, they do not distin-
guish between intra- and inter-agglomeration distances. Thus, it is not clear whether these bilateral distances
represent distances between agglomerations or those within an agglomeration (see Mori and Smith, 2015, §6
and Appendix B).
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(2017) is discussed in the next section.
6.2 Reduced-form regression approaches
We have thus far shown that endogenous agglomeration mechanisms generally do not iso-
late which existing agglomerations grow or decline given an improvement in interregional
transport access. This indeterminacy is due to the underlying second-nature advantage.
Nonetheless, the theory oﬀers a clear prediction of the global and local spatial pattern of
agglomerations. The former prediction is that there is agglomeration at the global scale: the num-
ber of agglomerations decreases, the distance between neighboring agglomerations increases
(reflecting the growing agglomeration shadow), and the sizes of the surviving individual
agglomerations increase (see Sections 5.1 and 5.3). The latter prediction is that there is dis-
persion at the local scale: The spatial extent of each individual agglomeration increases, for
example, in the form of suburbanization (see Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
In Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, we argue that these theoretical predictions are useful to
understand the diverse results from extant empirical studies using reduced-form regressions
to explain global and local patterns of agglomeration, respectively. Further, in Section 6.2.3,
we discuss the context in which these predictions can be actually tested.
6.2.1 On the size of an agglomeration
A typical regression model used to evaluate the impact of a new transport network on
regional growth has the following form (see, e.g., Redding and Turner, 2015, §20.4, for a
survey):
SIZEit  C0 + C1ACCESSit + C2xi + γit + ηt + ϵit (6.1)
where SIZEit and ACCESSit measure agglomeration size and interregional transport access,
respectively, in region i in year t; xi denotes the region-specific and year-invariant covariates,
γit denotes the region- and year-specific unobserved eﬀects, ηt denotes the year-specific
unobserved eﬀect, ϵit denotes the region- and year-specific errors, and C0, C1 and C2 are the
coeﬃcients to be estimated, where C1 is of interest here.
The existing literature on the relation between agglomeration size and interregional trans-
port access in a region shows mixed results. We start from two studies drawing contrasting
conclusions. Faber (2014) investigated the impact of the construction of the national highway
network in China on the agglomerations in peripheral counties during 1997–2006. Duranton
and Turner (2012) studied a similar situation in the United States during 1983–2003; how-
ever, they focused on the impact on agglomerations in relatively large metro areas instead
of peripheral alternatives. SIZEit represents the changes in output measures such as the
gross domestic product and gross value added as well as that of population size in a county
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in the former, while it is the change in metro-area population or employment in the lat-
ter. ACCESSit represents the change in interregional highway accessibility in both cases.44
Their results exhibited a stark diﬀerence: the former (latter) generally found a significantly
negative (positive) estimate of C1 in (6.1).
Yet, other studies report indefinite results. For Chinese data similar to those used by
Faber (2014), Baum-Snow, Henderson, Turner, Zhang and Brandt (2016, Tables 4 & 5) found
insignificant estimates of C1 when both large and small regions along the network were
included in the regression. For US data similar to those used by Duranton and Turner (2012),
Baum-Snow (2017, Table 5) ran a variant of (6.1) to estimate the impact of interregional
transport access on industry-specific employment in a metro area. However, the estimated
coeﬃcient of C1 was insignificant for all but manufacturing employment, for which it was
negatively significant.45 Thus, the estimated impacts of interregional transport access on the
size of an individual agglomeration vary widely, and there is no consensus, even on the sign
of the impacts.
From the knowledge on endogenous agglomeration mechanisms obtained in this study,
behind the incoherent regression results, we suspect the ignorance of the eﬀects of interre-
gional transport costs on the spatial distribution of agglomerations. Recall that, in class (i)
models, a uniform improvement in interregional accessibility at a given location does not
necessarily result in a growth or decline in agglomeration size at that location (see Section
5.1). It is thus natural to obtain an insignificant average eﬀect of improved transport access
along the new transport network as in Baum-Snow et al. (2016, Tables 4 & 5).46 What hap-
pened appears to be an agglomeration at the global scale toward a smaller number of larger
regions. In Faber (2014), the decline in peripheral regions is a mirror image of the growth
in core regions excluded from his regression.47 It is similarly expected that in Duranton and
44In the baseline specification of (6.1) in Faber (2014), ACCESSit represents a binary variable that takes the
value 1 if a given region i is connected by the newly constructed highway at time t, while it is set to the
initial sum of the interstate highway length within a metro area (i.e., in 1983) in Duranton and Turner (2012).
In particular, Duranton and Turner (2012) considered ACCESSit to be the level of intra-urban (rather than
inter-urban) transport infrastructure. However, we believe that the stock of interstate highways within a given
metro area also reflects the level of inter-urban connectivity.
45Similar studies by Storeygard (2016) and Yamasaki (2017) have established a positive relation between
interregional transport access and regional agglomeration in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa for 2002–2008 and
Japan for 1885–1920, respectively. Since the focus of these studies is the early stage of economic development,
their results may not be directly comparable with those of Faber (2014) and Duranton and Turner (2012) as well
aswith our theoretical results. For example, the latter study investigated the situation inwhich industrialization
took place along with the introduction of railways in response to the spread of steam power in Japan. However,
the decomposition of the causal relationship among industrialization, improvement in interregional transport
access, and urbanization is not obvious.
46The distance eﬀects vary across diﬀerent types of economic activities such as industries, which further
obscures their aggregate eﬀects on population agglomeration. See Head and Mayer (2004, §7.2) for a related
discussion based on market potential.
47It is also pointed out by Baum-Snow et al. (2016, Tables 4 & 5) that there was a significant increase in
agglomeration size in large regions in the China case.
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Turner (2012), the growth in large metro areas is a mirror image of the decline in the periph-
eral areas excluded from their regression, although there is no explicit discussion on this
aspect in their study.
Moreover, both Faber (2014, Table 6) and Duranton and Turner (2012, Table E2) found
evidence of the agglomeration shadow, namely that a larger distance from the nearest major
agglomeration tends to promote the growth of a region, which further suggests the relevance
of class (i) mechanisms.48
One way to more clearly distinguish diﬀerential impacts of transport network develop-
ment on individual regions is to introduce complementary variations in the measures of
interregional transport accessibility. Our theory suggested on the one hand that a general
improvement on transport accessibility induces global agglomeration, and hence, its average
eﬀect is ambiguous as suggested by the extant studies. On the other hand, in reality, the
development of transport network often results in substantially heterogeneous accessibilities
across nodes in the network. For example, the network nodes at junctions and terminals of
highways and high-speed railways typically are more likely on the shortest routes between
many pairs of locations than other nodes in the network, i.e., the betweenness is relatively
higher in these locations. A higher betweenness at a given region still does not necessar-
ily guarantee the growth of agglomeration there in the process of global agglomeration.
However, after controlling for the eﬀect of general improvement in transport accessibility, it
should be more likely that a major agglomeration takes place at one of these nodes with high
betweenness by the same reason that the exogenous regional advantage induces agglomer-
ation in Class (i) models (see Appendix D). See Mori and Takeda (2017) for a recent attempt
in this direction.
6.2.2 On the spatial extent of an agglomeration
Using the same specification (6.1) makes perfect sense when it comes to evaluating local dis-
persion. Baum-Snow (2007) and Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner and Zhang (2017)
presented evidence of local dispersion as a consequence of improved interregional transport
access in the cases ofUSmetro areas for 1950–1990 andChineseprefecturesduring 1990–2010,
respectively.49 In these studies, SIZEit denotes the change in the population/production size
of the central area within a larger region i (the metro area for the United States and the
province for China). They both reported a significantly negative estimated coeﬃcient of
C1 given an improvement in interregional access after controlling for the growth of each
48In Duranton and Turner (2012), the monotonic relationship between the size of a metro area and level
of inter-urban transport infrastructure in (6.1) is rationalized by assuming an open-city specification in the
underlying theoretical model. However, the significant urban shadow eﬀect among the included metro areas
casts doubt on this justification.
49Garcia-López (2012) and Garcia-López, Holl and Viladecans-Marsal (2015) conducted similar studies by
using Spanish data.
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region.50, 51 Their findings are consistent with our results on local dispersion (see Sections 5.2
and 5.3).52
Recall the population agglomeration at the global scale and dispersion at the local scale
in response to the development of the national highway and high-speed railway networks in
Japan after 1970 discussed in Section 1 (and Appendix A). Empirical evidence suggests that
China and the United States experienced essentially the same phenomena.
6.2.3 On the spatial patterns of agglomeration
Finally, we explore the possibility of testing our theoretical predictions on the spatial patterns
of agglomerations mentioned above rather than testing hypotheses about an individual
agglomeration by using regression models of type (6.1). For population agglomerations,
we typically have only a single set of agglomerations at a given point in time, which makes
the hypotheses concerning their spatial distribution untestable. However, such tests become
possible by considering an individual industry as a unit of observation. If a distinct set of
agglomerations can be identified for each industry, we have variations in the spatial patterns
of agglomerations across industries at a given point in time. As a recent attempt, Mori et
al. (2017) adopted the clustering framework developed by Mori and Smith (2014) and used
data on three-digit manufacturing industries in Japan during 1995–2015. They showed that
the number of agglomerations decreases (i.e., agglomeration at the global scale proceeds)
and the average areal size of individual agglomerations increases (i.e., dispersion at the local
scale proceeds) in response to a decrease in industry-specific sensitivity to transport costs:
the transport cost per unit distance and unit value of output.53 In their study, by setting a unit
of observation to an individual industry, the variation across industries made it possible to
directly test the two predictions from our theoretical results mentioned above on the spatial
patterns of agglomerations.
To sum up, knowledge on the behavior of general economic geography models brings
together seemingly unrelated pieces of empirical evidence on agglomeration patterns. Our
interpretation of the results from the literature suggests the strong relevance of endogenous
agglomeration mechanisms to the observed regional variations in agglomeration size.
50As discussed in these studies, the results for local dispersion can also be interpreted as suburbanization
in response to improved intra-urban transport infrastructure in classical urban economic theory (e.g., Alonso,
1964).
51Faber (2014, Table 5 and Figure 4) showed related evidence that agglomeration relatively proceeds in
regions at a certain distance (around 100–150 km) from highways rather than those along highways.
52Baum-Snow (2017) extended the work of Baum-Snow (2007) by replacing the outcome variable in (6.1) with
the local dispersion (or suburbanization) of employment in each industry instead of population and showed
variations in the extent of the local dispersion across industries.
53This definition of the sensitivity to transport costs is an empirical counterpart of the iceberg transport costs
in our theoretical models.
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6.3 Structural model-based approaches
We now turn to the structural model-based approach used to evaluate the causal eﬀects of
regional agglomerations summarized by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017, §3). In this
perhaps one of the most popular approaches in quantitative spatial economics, the basic
premise is that the primary source of the regional variation in agglomeration size is the
heterogeneity in exogenous (or first-nature) regional advantages rather than endogenous (or
second-nature) advantages considered in this study. Thus, given the exogenous productivity
or residential amenity diﬀerence across regions, a larger population of a given region is
always associated with higher exogenous productivity or amenity in that region.
A remarkable feature of thesemodels (e.g., Redding andSturm, 2008;Allen andArkolakis,
2014) is that they not only rely on exogenous advantages to explain agglomeration patterns
but also incorporate agglomeration externalities to the extent that the unique equilibrium
is guaranteed, thereby preserving the tractability of the model.54, 55 This subtle situation has
been realized by adopting class (ii) models. As shown in Section 5.2, these models have a
parameter range in which agglomeration diseconomies dominate agglomeration economies
independently of the level of transport costs. This special property of class (ii) models is
due to the independence of local dispersion forces on the distance structure of the model. In
this context, the model parameters are calibrated to replicate the relevant regional variations
(such as regional population sizes) in the absence (or presence) of a given treatment such
as transport development; then the counterfactual regional variations are derived in the
presence (or absence) of the treatment given these calibrated parameter values.
There are two caveats in understanding the implications obtained from the results of this
approach.
First, although agglomeration externalities account for some of the regional variations,
most variations appear to be absorbed by the structural residuals. Consider the study by
Redding and Sturm (2008), for example. By using a many-region extension of the Helpman
(1998) model, they quantified the impact of the change in market accessibility in Germany
before and after the division/reunification of the country after the war. To determine
the time-invariant set of parameter values, their model was calibrated to fit the city size
distributions in prewar Germany. If the log of actual city size is regressed on the log of
unobserved amenity (i.e., the structural residuals), one can immediately find that most of
the variation in city size is explained by these residuals, as shown in Figure 13, in which the
54Redding (2016) andMonte et al. (2016) extended the work of Redding and Sturm (2008) by adding diﬀerent
sources of exogenous location-fixed factors.
55Themajority of structuralmodel-based studies of a regional economy involvenoagglomeration externalities
(see, e.g., Donaldson andHornbeck, 2016; Baum-Snowet al., 2016; Alder, 2016; Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg
and Sarte, 2016).
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Figure 13: The relationship between city sizes and the estimated unobserved amenities in Redding
and Sturm (2008)
dashed line indicates the fitted line by OLS:
log(Li/L)  −7.191(0.210) + 1.587(0.050) log(Aˆi) , adj.R
2
 0.896 (6.2)
where Li and L denote the population size of city i and average city size in prewar Ger-
many, respectively, and Aˆi denotes the estimated unobserved amenity (i.e., the variation
unexplained by the model) in city i. Standard errors are in parentheses.56 Thus, 90% of the
variation in city size is unexplained by the model and fixed exogenously in their counterfac-
tual exercises. While this is not surprising given that there is no possibility of endogenous
agglomeration in this setup, the result indicates that the structure of their model plays only
a small role (10% at most) in explaining the treatment eﬀect.
Second, their predictions of treatment eﬀects crucially depend on a specific feature of
the underlying economic geography models. In particular, in class (ii) models, the decline
in interregional transport costs reduces each regional agglomeration caused by the first-
nature advantage of the region and promotes local dispersion. This causal relation was
demonstrated by a numerical counterfactual exercise in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017,
§3.9). In fact, it canbe formally shown (seeAppendixD) that this scale-downeﬀect is a general
property of class (ii) models, although there are certain cases in which local landownership
mitigates the eﬀect by counteracting congestion externalities.
However, if class (i) models are used instead, even in the parameter range in which
no endogenous agglomeration occurs (as in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, §3), the
sign of the treatment eﬀect reverses, namely agglomeration externalities would scale up
the first-nature advantage (see Appendix D for a formal proof). The resulting implications
thus become the opposite depending on the choice of dispersion force to be included in the
56The data for the regression are available from the online appendix of Redding and Sturm (2008).
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model.57
Thus, even in the context in which first-nature heterogeneity plays a primary role, knowl-
edge of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion mechanisms is crucial to understand
the logic and direction of the treatment eﬀect. For that purpose, our stylized analytical
framework appears to be useful.
More recent structural approaches have shifted to accommodate multiple equilibria with
endogenous agglomerations (e.g., Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2017; Nagy, 2017). In
that case, class (ii) models are no longer useful, as they can endogenously generate at most
a unimodal agglomeration. To explain both multiple agglomerations and local dispersion
by using endogenous mechanisms, one needs a model of either class (iii) or of a more
general class not addressed in this study. We briefly touch on these issues in Section 7 when
delineating future research directions.
7 Concluding remarks
In this study, we formally classified economic geography models in terms of their model-
specific spatial patterns of agglomeration. By allowing the presence of many regions, the
spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion is made explicit unlike the two-region setup or
many-region setup without an interregional space. In particular, the two dispersions at high
and low transport costs that look identical in a two-region setup turned out to diﬀer and
take place at global and local spatial scales, respectively. In fact, when dispersion proceeds
at the local scale, agglomeration typically proceeds at the same time but at the global scale
and vice versa.
Our theoretical results indicated a new direction for future empirical research based on
endogenous agglomerations. First, the contrasting agglomeration and dispersion behaviors
at diﬀerent spatial scales suggest the need to distinguish individual agglomerations rather
than measuring agglomeration by using a scalar index. Second, endogenous agglomeration
and dispersion mechanisms generally do not isolate the growth and decline in individual
agglomerations and can only provide insights into their spatial patterns. Our new results on
the impact of transport development on the spatial patterns of agglomeration could thus pro-
57Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) used a specification similar to those of class (ii) models to study the impact
of transport network development in European countries. In their model, the variation in regional advantage
is exogenous, while there are congestion externalities in interregional transportation. Since the externalities
are eﬀective only locally, they act as a local dispersion force in class (ii) models when agents are mobile. Like
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017, §3.9), under this model, they observe (Figure 5 in their paper) that an
improvement in interregional transport access generally mitigates the variation in regional advantages, which
disperses population from the originally larger (more advantageous) regions to the originally smaller regions.
Although the average impact of improved transport access on regional population growth is found to be
insignificant (Table 1 in their paper), one must bear in mind that this result reflects the fact that the signs of the
impact of improved transport access are the opposite in the originally larger and smaller regions.
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vide a unified interpretation of the variety of existing results from reduced-form regressions
on regional agglomerations. Furthermore, we showed that our analytical framework is use-
ful for obtaining formal predictions of treatment eﬀects in structural model-based analyses
that aim to explain agglomeration patterns.
However, the relatively simple classification of the spatial scale of agglomeration and
dispersion in our study is owing to the simple structure of the models considered. Below, we
discuss possible future directions of theoretical research to account for richer, more realistic
variations in agglomeration and dispersion across diﬀerent spatial scales.
At least three major research directions could be pursued. The first possible extension is
to distinguish location incentives between firms and consumers/workers as is traditionally
done in the urban economics literature (e.g., Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Ota and Fujita, 1993;
Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). In all the models considered in this study, the location
incentive of firms and that of consumers/workers coincide. This simplification may be
justifiable when the global pattern of agglomeration (in particular, sizes and locations of
cities) is the subject of the study. However, their distinction becomes crucial for explaining
the location patterns within a city. There are recent attempts, for example, by Ahlfeldt et al.
(2015) and Owens et al. (2017) in this direction. These models typically abstract from the
intercity/regional interactions in an open-city setup. Nonetheless, the possible equilibrium
patterns and their stability properties in this class of models are still not well known and this
could thus represent a fruitful avenue for future research.
The second possibility is to consider diﬀerent transport cost structures by industry. For
instance, Fujita and Krugman (1995) introduced transport costs for land-intensive rural
(agricultural) goods along with those of urban goods. In the presence of rural goods that
are costly to transport, the delivered price for such goods is lower in regions farther away
from the agglomerations, which generates a dispersion force. This is similar to the local
dispersion force in that even a small deviation from an urban agglomeration will decrease
the price of rural goods and increase the payoﬀ of the deviant. However, the advantage of
dispersion persists outside the agglomeration, i.e., it depends on the distance structure of the
model. This type of dispersion force leads to the formation of an industrial belt, a continuum
of agglomeration associated with multiple atoms of agglomeration as demonstrated by the
simulations inMori (1997) and Ikeda, Murota, Akamatsu and Takayama (2017b). The formal
characterization of industrial belts remains to be carried out.
The final possible extension is to incorporate diversity in increasing returns, leading
to diversity in the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion as well as diversity in
agglomeration size. In all the models with a global dispersion force considered in this study,
the sizes of agglomerations in the equilibrium are basically the same (see the simulation
exercises in Section 5.1) since each model has only one type of increasing return. This
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is counterfactual as actual city size distributions are diverse and well known to roughly
follow the power law.58 Initial attempts to account for the diversity in increasing returns by
introducingmultiple increasing returns industries have beenmade in the context of theNEG
models proposed by, e.g., Fujita et al. (1999b), Tabuchi and Thisse (2011), and Hsu (2012)’s
spatial competition model. Alternatively, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009), Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2014), Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), Desmet et al. (2017), and Nagy
(2017) incorporated dynamic externalities through endogenous innovation and spillover
eﬀects.
58The models considered in this study are consistent with heterogeneously sized agglomerations in the
equilibrium; however, it is not possible to replicate the high diversity of city sizes seen in reality.
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A Development of the transport network and urban agglom-
eration (UA) patterns in Japan, 1970–2015
To compare population agglomeration patterns in Japan, we define an urban agglomeration (UA) as
the set of contiguous 1 km-by-1 km cells with a population density of at least 1000/km2 and total
population of at least 10,000.59 (The basic results below remain the same for alternative threshold
densities and populations.) For the part of Japan contiguous by roads to at least one of the four major
islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu), 503 and 450 UAs are identified, as depicted in
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 14 for 1970 and 2015, respectively, where the warmer color indicates a
larger population. These together account for 64% and 78% of the total population in 1970 and 2015,
respectively. Thus, there is a substantial 18% increase in the urban share over these 40 years. Of the
503 UAs that existed in 1970, 302 survived, while 201 either disappeared or integrated with other UAs
by 2015. Of the 450 UAs that existed in 2015, 148 were newly formed after 1970 (including those split
from existing UAs).60
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 14 show the highway and high-speed railway networks in use in 1970
and 2015, respectively. The comparison of these panels indicates an obvious substantial expansion of
these networks during these 45 years, as mentioned in the text.
Panels (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 15 show the distributions of the growth rates of population share
(in the national population), the areal size and population density of individual UAs for the set of the
302 UAs that survived throughout the 45-year period. A UA experienced an average growth rate of
21% (75%) of population share, 94% (105%) of areal size, and −22% (22%) of population density (per
km2), respectively, where the numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations.
As a larger population share was concentrated in a smaller number of UAs in 2015 than in 1970,
the spatial size of an individual UA almost doubled on average. However, these spatial expansions
are not simply due to the shortage of available land in UAs. Note that population density decreased
by 22% on average. We take this as evidence of global concentration with local dispersion under the
improvement in interregional transport access.
59Population count data are obtained fromStatistics Bureau,Ministry of InternalAﬀairs andCommunications
of Japan (1970, 2015).
60UA i in year s is said to be associated with UA j in year t (, s) if the intersection of the spatial coverage of
i and that of j accounts for the largest population of i among all the UAs in year t. For years s < t, if i and
j are associated with each other, they are considered to be the same UA. If i is associated with j but not vice
versa, then i is considered to have been absorbed into j, while if j is associated with i but not vice versa, then
j is considered to have separated from i. If i is not associated with any UA in year t, then i is considered to
have disappeared by year t, while if j is not associated with any UA in year s, then j is considered to have newly
emerged by year t.
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(a) Urban agglomrations in 1970 (b) Urban agglomrations in 2015
(c) Highway and high-speed railway network in 1970 (d) Highway and high-speed railway network in 2015
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Figure 14: UAs and transport network in Japan
(a) Population share growth (b) Area growth (c) Population density growth
Average = 0.21
Standard deviation= 0.75
Average = 0.94
Standard dveiation = 1.05
Average = -0.22
Standad dveiation = 0.22
Figure 15: Growth rates of the sizes of UAs in Japan
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B Racetrack economy and simplification of the stability anal-
ysis
The friction matrix D for a racetrack economy is a circulant matrix. In this appendix, we first review
some useful properties of circulant matrices. Then, we see how the stability analysis of the flat-earth
pattern in a symmetric racetrack economy is simplified by these properties.
B.1 Facts on the properties of circulant matrices
A circulant matrix C of dimension K is defined as a K-by-K square matrix of the form
C ≡

c0 c1 c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1
cK−1 c0 c1 c2 · · · cK−2
cK−2
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . c2
c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1 c0 c1
c1 c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1 c0

. (B.1.1)
The elements of each row of C are identical to those of the previous row, but are moved one position
to the right and wrapped around. The whole circulant is evidently determined by the first row vector
c  (ci)K−1i0 . Circulant matrices are known to satisfy the following properties (see, e.g., Horn and
Johnson, 2012):
Lemma B.1. LetC1 andC2 be circulant matrices. Then, their sumC1+C2 and productC1C2 also are
circulants. They are also commutative, i.e., C1C2  C2C1. Let C3 be a non-singular circulant matrix.
Then, its inverse C−13 is also a circulant.
Lemma B.2. Let C be a K-by-K circulant matrix. Let Z  [z jk] be the discrete Fourier transformation
(DFT) matrix, where z jk  K−1/2 exp[iθ jk] with θ ≡ 2pi/K and i ≡
√−1. Then, C is diagonalized by
the similarity transformation by Z as Z∗CZ  diag[λ], where ∗ denotes the conjugate transpose.
λ  (λi) are the eigenvalues of C. The kth eigenvalue and associated eigenvector of C are λk and the
kth row of the DFT matrix Z, respectively. Furthermore, λ is given by the DFT of the first row vector
c of C as λ  K1/2Zc⊤.
Remark B.1. It follows that all K-by-K circulant matrices share the same eigenvectors.
Consider a matrix A defined by a matrix polynomial of a non-singular circulant matrix C:
A  c0I + c1C + c2C2 + · · · . (B.1.2)
Thanks to Lemma B.1 and B.2, one has that (i) A is a circulant matrix (note that I is also a circulant)
and thus that (ii) its eigenvalues µ ≡ (µi) are given by those of C, λ, by the relation
diag[µ]  Z∗AZ  Z∗(c0I + c1C + c2C2 + · · · )Z  c0I + c1 diag[λ] + c2 diag[λ]2 + · · · , (B.1.3)
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or, in the element-wise manner,
µk  c0 + c1λk + c2λ2k + · · · . (B.1.4)
Remark B.2. If C is also symmetric, A is symmetric. This implies that the eigenvalues λ  (λk) and
µ  (µk) as well as their associated eigenvectors are all real.
B.2 Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the friction matrix
We derive the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the friction matrix for later use. To simplify the
notation, we define r ∈ (0, 1) to represent the freeness of transport between two consecutive regions on
the racetrack: r(τ) ≡ exp[−τ/K], where we rescale τ so that the circumferential length of the economy
is fixed. From the definition of r, it is a monotonically decreasing function of the transportation cost
(technology) parameter τ and hence r and τ are mutually interchangeable. We use r as the transport
technology parameter in the present appendix. By using r, one has di j  rℓi j .
To analyze specificmodels, it is useful toderive the eigenvaluesof the row-normalized frictionmatrix
D¯ ≡ D/d with d ≡ ∑ j∈K d0, j . We note that every row has the same row sum becauseD is circulant.
It turns out that in a racetrack economy, D is a circulant matrix since di j  rℓi j  rℓi+1, j+1  di+1, j+1
for all i , j (modK for indices). Furthermore, D is symmetric and real and hence all the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors are real. The analytical expressions of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of D¯ are
available (Akamatsu et al., 2012):
Lemma B.3. Let fk(r) be the kth eigenvalue of the row-normalized friction matrix D¯ for a racetrack
economy with K regions. Assume that K is a multiple of four. DefineΨk(r) > 0 and Ψ¯(r) > 0 by
Ψk(r) ≡ 1 − r
2
1 − 2{cos[θk]}r + r2 , Ψ¯(r) ≡
1 + rK/2
1 − rK/2 (B.2.1)
with θ  2pi/K. Then, { fk(r)} is given by
fk(r) 

Ψk(r)ΨK/2(r) (k: even)
Ψk(r)ΨK/2(r)Ψ¯(r) (k: odd)
k  0, 1, 2, . . . , K/2, (B.2.2)
where k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1 are of multiplicity two. The associated eigenvectors are
η0  (1, 1, . . . , 1), (B.2.3)
η+k  (cos[θki]), η−k  (sin[θki]) k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1, (B.2.4)
ηK/2  (1,−1, 1,−1, . . . , 1,−1) (B.2.5)
where η+k and η
−
k are the two eigenvectors associated with fk(r) (k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1).
Remark B.3. For each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 − 1, we may focus on a single eigenvector of the form ηk 
η+k  (cos[θki]) since we do not distinguish rotationally symmetric patterns; any linear combination
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of η+k and η
−
k reduces to a single trigonometric curve with the same wavelength as them.
See Figure 2 and Figure 3 for an illustration. In particular, f0(r)  1, f1(r)  (1 − r)/(1 + r), and
fK/2(r)  {(1− r)/(1+ r)}2. Furthermore, by employing the analytical expression of { fk(r)} in Lemma
B.3, one shows
Corollary B.1. { fk(r)} satisfy the following properties if K is a multiple of four.
1. Every fk(r) is a monotonically decreasing function of r except for f0(r)  1.
2. For all r, { fk(r)} with k  0, 1, 2, . . . , K/2 are ordered as
1  f0 > f2 > · · · > f2k > · · · > fK/2 ,
1 > f1 > f3 > · · · > f2k+1 > · · · > fK/2−1.
(B.2.6)
with f1(r) > f2(r) and fK/2−1(r) > fK/2(r).
The second property yields that mink{ fk(r)}  fK/2(r) and maxk≥1{ fk(r)}  f1(r) for all r. We note
that every fk(r(τ)) (k ≥ 1) as a function of τ is monotonically increasing.
Example B.1. In a racetrack economy with K  4, the friction matrixD is given by
D 

1 r r2 r
1 r r2
1 r
Sym. 1

. (B.2.7)
Its row sum is d  1+ r + r2 + r  (1+ r)2 and thus D¯  D/(1+ r)2. The eigenvalues of D¯ are given by
f0  1, f1 
1 − r
1 + r
, f2 
(
1 − r
1 + r
)2
. (B.2.8)
The associated eigenvectors are η0  (1, 1, 1, 1), η+1  (1, 0,−1, 0), η−1  (0, 1, 0,−1), and η2 
(1,−1, 1,−1).
B.3 Representing the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯) by those of D¯
We assume that the payoﬀ function v is diﬀerentiable. Let D ≡ {h ∈ RK | h · 1  H, hi ≥ 0} denote
the set of possible spatial patterns. For simplicity, we assume that v is defined for the non-negative
orthant RK+ .
Assumption B.1. The payoﬀ function v : RK+ → RK is continuously diﬀerentiable.
Given v, we define a spatial equilibrium by the following variational inequality problem (VIP):
[VIP] Find h∗ ∈ D such that v(h∗) · (h − h∗) ≤ 0 for all h ∈ D . (B.3.1)
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Definition B.1. A spatial equilibrium is a solution to [VIP].
An alternative equivalent definition of the long-run equilibria is found in the main text.
The flat-earth equilibrium h¯ ≡ (h , h , . . . , h) with h ≡ H/K is obviously a spatial equilibrium;
because v(h¯)  v¯1with the uniform level of payoﬀ v¯, we have v(h¯)·(h−h¯)  v¯1 ·(h−h¯)  v¯(H−H)  0
for all h ∈ D. In preparation for Appendix B.4 below, we discuss the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium. Appendix C demonstrates that at the flat-
earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we can express the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function
in the following way:
∇v(h¯)  G0(D¯)G(D¯), (B.3.2)
G(D¯) ≡ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 , (B.3.3)
whereG0(·) andG(·) are interpreted asmatrix polynomials. G0(D¯) is a positive definitematrix defined
by D¯. Since D¯ is circulant, ∇v(h¯) is also circulant. Thus, we can express the kth eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯),
ek , by that of D¯, fk , in terms of the model-dependent functions G0( f ) and G( f ):
ek  G0( fk)G( fk) (B.3.4)
where G0( fk) and G( fk) are the kth eigenvalues of G0(D¯) and G(D¯), respectively. The associated
eigenvectors are the same as those of D¯. As we have G0( fk) > 0, to examine the sign of ek , we only
need to check that of G( fk).
B.4 Stability analysis of the flat-earth equilibrium
By employing the above results, this section derives the results presented in Sections 2.3 and 3.
Notations. In relation toD, let TD(h) ≡ {z ∈ RK | z  α(y −h) for some y ∈ D and α ≥ 0} denote
the tangent cone of D at h ∈ D and TD ≡ {z ∈ RK | z · 1  0} denote the tangent space of D. Note
that for any h ∈ intD, we have TD(h)  TD becauseD is a convex subset of a hyperplane.
B.4.1 Derivations for Section 2.3
We summarize our assumptions on the dynamic F as follows, where with notational abuse we let
F (h)  F (h, v(h)). We assume that F is defined for the non-negative orthant RK+ .
Assumption B.2. The dynamic F : RK+ → RK satisfies the following properties:
1. (Conservation) the total mass of mobile agents is invariant, i.e., F (h) ∈ TD(h) for all h ∈ D.
2. (Diﬀerentiability) F (h) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to h and v(h) inD.
3. (Stationarity at spatial equilibria) if h∗ is a spatial equilibrium, then F (h∗)  0.
4. (Positive correlation) v(h) · F (h) > 0 for all h ∈ D such that F (h) , 0.
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Example B.2. The set of dynamics that satisfies Assumption B.2 includes the replicator dynamic (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978), which is the leading instance of the general class of imitative dynamics, the Brown–
von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950; Nash, 1951), which is an instance of
excess payoﬀ dynamics, and, for interior equilibria, the projection dynamic (Dupuis andNagurney, 1993).
For more examples, see Sandholm (2010).
Consider a small deviation η ∈ TD(h∗)  TD at an interior equilibrium h∗ ∈ intD. By conserva-
tion, we must have F (h∗ + η) ∈ TD for such η; it follows that
F (h∗ + η)  F (h∗) + ∇F (h∗)η + o(‖η‖)  ∇F (h∗)η + o(‖η‖) ∈ TD . (B.4.1)
Since J ≡ ∇F (h∗) maps all η ∈ TD into TD, J defines a linear map from TD to TD. Thus, the
stability analysis of an interior equilibrium h∗ reduces to examining the eigenvalues of the restricted
linear map J : TD → TD. We thus focus on the deviations η that live in TD (i.e., η such that
η · 1  0). In eﬀect, we can ignore g0, which is the associated eigenvalue for η0 ≡ (1, 1, . . . , 1) because
η0 is the basis for TD⊥ (the orthogonal space of TD, which is one-dimensional).
For general isolated interior equilibria h∗ ∈ intD, we have v(h∗)  v¯1 with the uniform level of
payoﬀ v¯ and F (h∗)  0, implying that v(h∗) ·F (h∗)  0. Because h∗ is an isolated interior equilibrium,
the positive correlation property of F requires that there is a neighborhood O ⊂ D of h∗ such that
v(h) · F (h) > 0 for all h ∈ O \ {h∗}. Moreover, from the diﬀerentiability of v and F in intD, we can
expand v andF in the vicinity of the equilibrium; that is, for a suﬃciently small η such that h∗+η ∈ D
(i.e., η ∈ TD), the positive correlation property is equivalent to the condition:
(v¯1 + ∇v(h∗)η) · (F (h∗) + Jη)  (∇v(h∗)η) · (Jη) > 0. (B.4.2)
Note that (Jη) · 1  0 because Jη ∈ TD for all η ∈ TD.
In (B.4.2), suppose that η  ηk , where ηk (k ≥ 1) is the kth eigenvector of the restricted linear map
J with the associated eigenvalue being gk . Then, with h  h∗ + ηk , we have
(Jηk) · (∇v(h∗)ηk)  (gkηk) · (∇v(h∗)ηk)  gk(η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk) > 0, (B.4.3)
which shows that, as in (2.1), if gk and ηk are real (in particular, if J is symmetric)
sgn[gk]  sgn[η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk]  sgn
[∑
i∈K
δViηk ,i
]
where δVi ≡
∑
j∈K
∂vi(h∗)
∂h j
ηk ,i . (B.4.4)
B.4.2 Derivations for Section 3
At the flat-earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we have stronger results. First, because J and
∇v(h¯) are both symmetric and circulant, the eigenvectors for the two matrices are both real and the
same (see Appendix B.1). Thus, by letting ek be the kth eigenvalue of ∇v(h¯), which is associated with
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the eigenvector ηk  (ηk ,i)  (cos[θki]) (see Lemma B.3), (B.4.3) further implies that
gk
(
η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk
)
 gk
(
ekη⊤k ηk
)
 gkek ‖ηk ‖2 > 0. (B.4.5)
By noting that gk and ek are real, at the flat-earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we have
sgn[gk]  sgn[ek] (B.4.6)
for all k ≥ 1. For convenience, we introduce a notation to describe the above situation.
Definition B.2. LetA andB be two K-by-K symmetric circulant matrices. ByA ≃ B, we denote that
A  CB with a symmetric circulant matrix C that is positive definite relative to TD.
Observe that if we have J ≃ B for some symmetric circulant matrixB, we may study the eigenvalues
of B instead of those of J to examine the stability of h¯. Because J  CB and J , C, and B are
circulant, by employing the properties of circulant matrices, we have gk  ckbk with ck and bk being
the eigenvalues of C and B, respectively; moreover, because J , B, and C are symmetric, gk , bk , and
ck are real (Appendix B.1). Since C is symmetric, circulant, and positive definite relative to TD, we
have ck > 0 for k ≥ 1. In sum, it follows that sgn[gk]  sgn[bk] for k ≥ 1. We summarize this as
follows.
Lemma B.4. Assume that the dynamic F satisfies Assumption B.2 and consider the flat-earth equi-
librium h¯ in a racetrack economy. Then, J ≡ ∇F (h¯) and ∇v(h¯) are both symmetric and circulant.
Furthermore, we have J ≃ ∇v(h¯).
Thus, for the stability analysis of h¯, we may study the signs of the eigenvalues ek (k ≥ 1) of ∇v(h¯)
because we have sgn[gk]  sgn[ek]. In particular, by using our notation, J satisfies
J ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 (B.4.7)
at the flat-earth equilibrium (see Appendix B.3). Thus, the stability of h¯ is governed by the model-
dependent function G(·) in (B.3.3) because (B.4.7) implies
sgn[gk]  sgn[G( fk)], (B.4.8)
G( fk) ≡ c0 + c1 fk + c2 f 2k . (B.4.9)
Furthermore, not only the signs but also the magnitudes of the eigenvalues {gk} and {ek} of J
and ∇v(h¯) are often related in a much stronger way.
Observation B.1. For canonical evolutionary dynamics in the literature, it often follows that gk  c¯ek
for k ≥ 1with a common, positive constant c¯.
Example B.3. The replicator dynamic, which is the de facto standard dynamic in the NEG literature,
is defined by Fi(h) ≡ hi{vi(h) − v¯(h)} where v¯(h) ≡ (1/H)∑ j∈K v j(h)h j is the average payoﬀ across
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regions. One has
∇F (h)  ψ0(h) + ψ1(h)∇v(h) (B.4.10)
with ψ0(h) and ψ1(h) defined by ψ0(h) ≡ diag[v(h) − v¯(h)1] − (1/H)hv(h)⊤ and ψ1(h) ≡ diag[h](I −
(1/H)1h⊤), respectively. It follows that, at the flat-earth equilibrium, ψ0(h¯)  −v¯E and ψ1(h¯) 
h (I −E), where E ≡ (1/K)11⊤ is a K-by-K matrix whose elements are all 1/K. This implies that
gk 

−v¯ < 0 if k  0,
hek if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
(B.4.11)
where {ek} are the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯). Therefore, J ≃ ∇v(h¯) as well as c¯  h.
B.4.3 Extension: Taste heterogeneities
The local stability of the equilibria in models with idiosyncratic taste heterogeneity á la Murata (2003)
and Redding (2016) can be analyzed by employing the associated perturbed best response dynamics as is
conducted by Akamatsu et al. (2012) for the logit equilibrium under the logit dynamic. To be precise,
for models with a randomized preference v˜(h) and the associated perturbed best response dynamic
F˜ , we have J  ∇F˜ (h¯, v˜(h¯)) ≃Φ∇v(h¯)−ηI, where η is a positive constant that reflects themagnitude
of the heterogeneity andΦ is the projection matrix onto TD. v(h) is interpreted as the homogeneous
part of the underlying payoﬀ function v˜(h) (see Sandholm, 2010). Assuming idiosyncratic taste
heterogeneity is thus mathematically equivalent to incorporating an extra local dispersion force.61
Example B.4 (Logit equilibrium). Consider a logit equilibrium (an equivalent of an equilibriumunder
an idiosyncratic multiplicative Fréchet shock in the payoﬀ function) with the noise parameter η. It is
standard that the equilibrium condition is
hi  Pi(h)H, where Pi(h) ≡ exp[vi(h)/η]∑
j∈K exp[v j(h)/η] . (B.4.12)
The logit dynamic is defiled by Fi(h)  HPi(h) − hi . At h¯, for the finite values of η, we have
J  η−1Φ∇v(h¯) − I ≃Φ∇v(h¯) − ηI . (B.4.13)
Observe that η →∞ implies J  −I, which indicates that h¯ is always stable; it is intuitive that under
suﬃcient heterogeneity on the side of the preferences of mobile agents, the equilibrium is unique.
61Interested readers should consult Chapter 8 of Sandholm (2010) for local stability analysis via the lineariza-
tion of evolutionary dynamics in population games as well as the consequences of assuming random utility
models on the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic J at an equilibrium.
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C Analyses of economic geography models
In this appendix, we derive the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium,
∇v(h¯), for the models included in Table 1. As discussed in the main text and as in Appendix B above,
this suﬃces for our purpose. Table 2 at the end of this appendix summarizes the exact mappings
from each model to the coeﬃcients of a model-dependent function G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2. We note
that as soon as one has an analytical expression of G( f ), one can derive the break points with respect
to the relevant parameters and study the implications of the model.
C.1 Krugman (1991) (Km) model
Following Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999a), this section introduces a many-region version of
Krugman (1991)’s seminal model in line with our context.
Assumptions. There are K discrete regions whose set is denoted by K . There are two types
of workers: unskilled and skilled. Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor. The total
endowments of skilled and unskilled workers are H and L, respectively. Skilled workers are mobile
across regions; hi ≥ 0 denotes their population in region i, where h ≡ (hi)i∈K is their spatial pattern
across regions. Throughout Appendix C, D ≡ {h ∈ RK | h · 1  H, hi ≥ 0} denotes the set of
all possible spatial distributions of mobile (skilled) workers. Unskilled workers are immobile; their
population in region i is denoted by li .
There are two industrial sectors: agriculture (abbreviated as A) and manufacturing (abbreviated
as M). The A-sector is perfectly competitive and a unit input of unskilled labor is required to produce
one unit of goods. We choose A-sector goods as the numéraire. The M-sector is modeled by Dixit–
Stiglitzmonopolistic competition. M-sector goods are horizontally diﬀerentiated andproducedunder
increasing returns to scale using skilled labor as the input.
The goods of both sectors are transported. The transportation of A-sector goods is frictionless,
While the transportation of M-sector goods is of an iceberg form. For each unit of M-sector goods
transported from region i to j, only the proportion 1/τi j arrives, where τi j > 1 for i , j and τii  1.
Preference. All workers share an identical preference for both M- and A-sector goods. The utility
function U of a worker in region i is given by a two-tier form. The upper tier is the following
Cobb–Douglas function:
U(CMi , CAi )  µ lnCMi + (1 − µ) lnCAi (0 < µ < 1), (C.1.1)
whereCAi is the consumption ofA-sector goods in region i, C
M
i the lower-tiermanufacturing aggregate
in region i, and µ the constant expenditure share ofmanufacturedgoods. The lower tier,CMi , is defined
by the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate:
CMi ≡
(∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
q ji(ξ)(σ−1)/σdξ
)σ/(σ−1)
, (C.1.2)
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where n j is the number of varieties produced in region j, z q ji(ξ) is the consumption of variety
ξ ∈ [0, n j], and σ is the CES between any two varieties. As we take A-sector goods as the numéraire,
the budget constraint of a worker in region i is given by
CAi +
∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.1.3)
where p ji(ξ) denotes the delivered price in region i of the M-sector goods produced in region j and
yi denotes the income of the worker. The incomes (wages) of skilled and unskilled workers are
represented by wi and wui , respectively.
Demand. Utility maximization yields the following demand:
CMi  µ
yi
Pi
, CAi  (1 − µ)yi , q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi , (C.1.4)
where Pi denotes the price index of the diﬀerentiated product in region i:
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)1−σdξ
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.1.5)
Since the total income in region i is given by Yi  wihi + wui li , we have the following total demand
Q ji(ξ) for the variety ξ produced in j:
Q ji(ξ) 
µ{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P1−σi
(wihi + wui li). (C.1.6)
The total supply xi(ξ) of the diﬀerentiated variety ξ in region i should meet the total demand from
all regions including the transport costs incurred by shipments:
xi(ξ) 
∑
j∈K
τi jQi j(ξ). (C.1.7)
Firm behavior. With free trade in the A-sector, the wage of the unskilled worker wui is equalized.
As A-sector goods are the numéraire, we have wui  1. In the M-sector, to produce xi units of the
diﬀerentiated product, a firm requires α + βxi units of skilled labor. With increasing returns, every
firm specializes in a single variety. The cost function of a firm in region i producing variety ξ is thus
given by
Ci(xi(ξ)) ≡ wi{α + βxi(ξ)}. (C.1.8)
Therefore, an M-sector firm located in region i specializing in variety ξ faces the following profit:
Πi(ξ) 
∑
j∈K
pi j(ξ)Qi j(ξ) − Ci(xi(ξ)). (C.1.9)
56
Since we have a continuum of firms, each is negligible in the sense that its action has no impact on
the market (i.e., the price indices). It is standard that the profit maximization of firms yields
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1wiτi j (C.1.10)
and that pi j(ξ) is independent of ξ. This fact in turn implies that Qi j(ξ) and xi(ξ) also do not depend
on ξ. We thus omit ξ in the following.
Short-run equilibrium. In the short run, the spatial distribution h  (hi)i∈K of skilled workers is
fixed. Given h, we determine the short-run equilibrium wage w ≡ (wi)i∈K by the M-sector product
market-clearing condition (PMCC), zero-profit condition (ZPC), and skilled labor market-clearing
condition (LMCC). First, the ZPC for every M-sector firm dictates that xi  α(σ − 1)/β, meaning that
the required skilled labor input is ασ. Then, skilled labor-market clearing yields ασni  hi . By using
ni  hi/(ασ), we have
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
h j(w jτ ji)1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.1.11)
with di j ≡ τ1−σi j ; D  [di j]  [τ1−σi j ] is the friction matrix. By employing the formula up to here, the
M-sector PMCC (C.1.7) implies that
wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(w jh j + l j), (C.1.12)
which is the so-called wage equation. By adding up (C.1.12), we obtain∑
i∈K
wihi 
µ
1 − µL, (C.1.13)
which constrains w at any configuration h. The existence and uniqueness of the solution for the
wage equation under a fixed h and normalization constraint (C.1.13) follow from standard non-linear
complementarity problem arguments (Facchinei and Pang, 2007) and thus we omit them. Given the
solution w(h) of (C.1.12), we have the following indirect utility function of skilled workers:
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi], (C.1.14)
where κ¯ ≡ µ/(σ − 1) and ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K hkw1−σk dki . Note that we omit the constant terms as they do
not aﬀect the properties of the equilibrium spatial patterns. We follow this convention for the rest
of Appendix C. The long-run equilibria are defined by the VIP in Appendix B.3 based on the payoﬀ
function (C.1.14).
Jacobianmatrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Assumea racetrack economy (i.e., di j  τ1−σi j  exp[−τℓi j]
with τ > 0; see Section 3.1) with a uniform unskilled labor endowment (i.e., li  l ≡ L/K for all i ∈ K ).
Then, it is trivial that the flat-earth pattern is a long-run equilibrium. As we must evaluate ∇v(h¯), we
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first derive ∇v(h)  [∂vi(h)/∂h j] at any interior solution h. We have
∂vi(h)
∂h j

κ¯
∆i
(
∂∆i
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
(C.1.15)
 κ¯
(
1
∆i
w1−σj d ji + (1 − σ)
∑
k∈K
1
∆i
hkw−σk dki
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
(C.1.16)
 κ¯
(
1
h j
m ji + (1 − σ)
∑
k∈K
mki
1
wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
, (C.1.17)
where mi j ≡ hiw1−σi di j/∆ j , or in vector–matrix form M  [mi j]  diag[w1−σ ◦ h]D(diag[∆])−1 with
∆  [∆i]  D⊤ diag[w]1−σh. We let xa ≡ [xai ] and x ◦ y ≡ [xi yi]. Noting that κ¯(1 − σ)  −µ, we have
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 − µM⊤ diag[w]−1∇w(h) + diag[w]−1∇w(h) (C.1.18)
 κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 + (I − µM⊤) diag[w]−1∇w(h), (C.1.19)
where ∇w(h) ≡ [∂wi(h)/∂h j] is yet to be known. By letting
Wi(h,w) ≡ wihi − µ
∑
k∈K
mik(wkhk + l), (C.1.20)
the wage equation is equivalent toW (h,w)  0. Thanks to the implicit function theorem, it can be
shown that ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W ), where ∇wW ≡ [∂Wi/∂w j] and ∇W ≡ [∂Wi/∂h j] are given by
∂Wi
∂w j
 δi jhi − µ
∑
k∈K
∂mik
∂w j
(wkhk + l) − µmi jh j (C.1.21)
 δi jhi − µ(1 − σ) 1w j
(
δi j
∑
k∈K
mik(wkhk + l) −
∑
k∈K
mikm jk(wkhk + l)
)
− µmi jh j , (C.1.22)
∂Wi
∂h j
 δi jwi − µ
∑
k∈K
∂mik
∂h j
(wkhk + l) − µmi jw j (C.1.23)
 δi jwi − µ 1h j
(
δi j
∑
k∈K
mik(w jh j + l) −
∑
k∈K
mikm jk(wkhk + l)
)
− µmi jw j , (C.1.24)
with δi j being Kronecker’s delta. In vector–matrix form, we have
∇wW  diag[h] − µ(1 − σ)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 − µM diag[h] (C.1.25)
∇W  diag[w] − µ(diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[h]−1 − µM diag[w], (C.1.26)
where Y  [Yi] ≡ [wihi + l] is the vector of regional income.
Assume the flat-earth equilibrium, where h  h1with h ≡ H/K. Then, we know that the (uniform
level of the) equilibrium wage is given by w¯ ≡ µ/(1 − µ) · L/H and the (uniform level of the) total
income of a region is Y¯ ≡ l/(1− µ)  1/(1− µ) · L/K, where Y¯/w¯  h/µ and Y¯/h  w¯/µ. We also have
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M  D¯  D/d, where d is the row sum ofD. It then follows that
∇w(h¯)  w¯
h
[
σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1D¯ (µI − D¯) (C.1.27)
and thus that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[
I − κD¯ − ρD¯2]−1[(κ + κ¯)D¯ − (µκ¯ + σ−1)D¯2], (C.1.28)
where κ ≡ µ/σ and ρ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). We recall that circulant matrices commute (Lemma B.1). It
thus follows that for the Kmmodel, we have∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯+c2D¯2with c1  κ+ κ¯ and c2  −(µκ¯+σ−1).
Remark C.1. A comparison with the literature would be useful for providing some insights. By
letting {ek} be the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯), we have
ek 
1
h
fk
(κ + κ¯) − (µκ¯ + σ−1) fk
1 − κ fk − ρ f 2k

K
H
(
1 − ρ
ρ
)
fk
[
µ(1 + ρ) − (µ2 + ρ) fk
1 − µ(1 − ρ) fk − ρ f 2k
]
. (C.1.29)
However, this expression is a generalized version of equation (5.27) in Fujita et al. (1999a) for the Km
model in the symmetric two-region setting (with a rearrangement):
1
P−µ0
dω
dλ

2
λ + (1 − λ)
(
1 − ρ
ρ
)
Z
[
µ(1 + ρ) − (µ2 + ρ)Z
1 − µ(1 − ρ)Z − ρZ2
]
, (C.1.30)
which expresses the change in the real wage ω ≡ w0P−µ0 in region 0when its share of skilled workers
λ slightly increases. Here, Z is “an index of trade barriers” defined by equation (5.25), ibid:
Z ≡ 1 − T
1−σ
1 + T1−σ , (C.1.31)
where T > 1 is the iceberg transport cost parameter between regions. We thus see that the “real wage
diﬀerential” exercise often conducted in the literature is a special case of our approach. In fact, if we assume
K  2, the only possible deviation direction is η1  (1,−1), which corresponds to agglomeration
toward one of the regions. Given the freeness of transport r between the two regions, its associated
eigenvalue of D¯ is given by
f1 
1 − r
1 + r
, (C.1.32)
which precisely coincides with the above Z—since r  T1−σ for this case. In the two-region economy,
there is only a single possible deviation direction: agglomeration. We thus only have to investigate the
sign of dω/dλ. In a many-region racetrack economy, however, there are multiple possible deviation
directions and thus the stability of the flat-earth pattern depends on the signs of all (ek)K−1k1 .
Remark C.2. As emphasized by the literature, the coeﬃcients of G( f ) have clear economic interpre-
tations. The first, c1, represents the demand externality through a price index (κ¯) and a home market
eﬀect (κ). For the former, κ¯, observes that 1/(σ − 1) in κ¯ is the markup of firms or the magnitude
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of product diﬀerentiation; an agglomeration, by improving the proximity of mobile agents to the
production locations of firms, increases the payoﬀ of agglomerated regions. The latter, κ, is a home
market eﬀect. Note that 1/σ in κ is the share of the fixed cost (the wage of a mobile agent required
to operate) in a firm’s production cost. The second, c2, on the contrary, represents the dispersion
force. The centrifugal force of the model is due to the increased market competition caused by the
concentration of firms (the so-called “market-crowding eﬀect”). Since there is spatially dispersed
demand (immobile agents), firms in a region of agglomeration may hope to relocate to other, less
crowded regions (σ−1 in c2). In addition, the price-index eﬀect by reducing a firm’s market share
and hence the wage of mobile agents produces another global dispersion force (µκ¯ in c2). This eﬀect
produces a dispersion force from outside a region.
Numerical simulation. Figure 8 assumes the Km model. The parameters are set as µ  0.4, σ  10,
L  8, and H  1.
C.2 Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) (FO) model
The FO model is a slightly simplified version of Krugman (1991)’s NEG model. The model is
sometimes called the footloose-entrepreneur model, since a unit of skilled (mobile) labor is required as
the fixed input of a manufacturing firm. The only diﬀerence is that the variable input of M-sector
firms in the Km model is now replaced by unskilled labor. Specifically, to produce xi(ξ) units of
product ξ, an M-sector firm now requires α units of skilled labor and βxi(ξ) units of unskilled labor.
Therefore, for the FO model, the total cost of production for a firm in region i is
Ci(x(ξ))  αwi + βxi(ξ)wui . (C.2.1)
The wage equalization of the A-sector (wui  1 for all i ∈ K ) then implies that
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1τi j (C.2.2)
provided that A-sector goods are produced in every region (we assume βxini < li for all i ∈ K ).
Again, we drop ξ in what follows.
Short-run equilibrium. The short-run equilibrium conditions are again the PMCC, LMCC, and
ZPC. First, since a firm requires α units of skilled labor, the LMCC implies that αni  hi , which in
turn yields the price index Pi for the FO model:
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(
1
α
∑
j∈K
h jd ji
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.2.3)
where d ji ≡ τ1−σji is the trade friction between regions i and j. Note that unlike the Kmmodel, Pi does
not depend on the wage w  (wi)i∈K . The ZPC implies that the operating profit of a firm is entirely
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absorbed by the wage bills:
wi 
(∑
j∈K
pi jQi j − βxi
)
. (C.2.4)
Together with the PMCC, we have the following wage equation for the model:
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j∑
k∈K dk jhk
(w jh j + l j). (C.2.5)
This equation is analytically solvable. Specifically, in vector–matrix form, we have
w  κ [I − κM diag[h]]−1Ml, (C.2.6)
where κ ≡ µ/σ, l ≡ (li), andM ≡ [mi j]  [di j/∆ j]  D{diag[∆]}−1 with ∆i  ∑ j∈K d jih j , meaning
that ∆  [∆i]  D⊤h. The indirect utility v(h) of each of the many-region FO models is expressed as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi], (C.2.7)
where κ¯ ≡ µ/(σ − 1). We again ignore the constant terms. The long-run equilibria are defined by
(B.3.1) with respect to the above (C.2.7).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. In a racetrack economy, by following the same line of
logic as in the Km model, we obtain
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[I − κD¯]−1
[
(κ¯ + κ)D¯ − (κ¯κ + 1)D¯2
]
, (C.2.8)
where D¯ ≡ D/d. We thus conclude that ∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c1  κ¯ + κ and c2  −(κ¯κ + 1).
C.3 Pflüger (2004) (Pf) model
The Pf model is a further simplified version of the FO model (and hence the Km model) in which we
assume a quasi-linear utility function for the upper tier as follows:
U(CMi , CAi )  CAi + µ lnCMi . (C.3.1)
Taking A-sector goods as the numéraire, it is standard that utility maximization yields the following
demand, where the income eﬀect in CMi is lost compared with the Km and FO models:
CAi  yi − µ, CMi  µ
1
Pi
, (C.3.2)
where the price index Pi is the same as that in the FO model. Thus, by replacing the total income of a
region Yi  wihi + li in (C.2.5) with the total number of workers hi + li , we obtain the following “wage
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equation”:
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j∑
k∈K dk jhk
(h j + l j), (C.3.3)
which has already been solved. Indirect utility is given by
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + wi , (C.3.4)
where∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K d jih j . The long-run equilibria are defined by (B.3.1) with respect to the above (C.2.7).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We show
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ + κ (M −M diag[H]M⊤) (C.3.5)
withH  [Hi] ≡ [hi + li] andM  [mi j] ≡ [di j/∆ j] and thus that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[
(κ¯ + κ)D¯ − κ(1 + ϵ)D¯2
]
(C.3.6)
with ϵ  L/H being the ratio of the number of unskilled to skilled workers. We thus see that
∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c1  κ¯ + κ and c2  −κ(1 + ϵ).
C.4 Helpman (1998) (Hm) model
Helpman (1998) removed the A-sector in Krugman (1991) and thereby assumed that all workers are
mobile. Instead of the A-sector, the Hm model introduces the housing (abbreviated as H) sector and
each region i is endowed with a fixed stock Ai of housing.
Preference. The utility function of a worker in region i is given by
U(CMi , CHi )  µ lnCMi + γ lnCHi , (C.4.1)
where CHi is the consumption of H-sector goods in region i and γ is its constant expenditure share
(γ + µ  1). The budget constraint of a worker located in region i is represented by
pHi C
H
i +
∑
j
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.4.2)
where pHi is the price of H-sector goods in region i. Utility maximization leads to the following
demand for H-sector goods:
CHi  γ
yi
pHi
. (C.4.3)
Housing market clearing. In the H-sector, total demand hiCHi in region i cannot be greater than
maximum supply Ai . If demand in region i is less than supply, the price pHi should be the lower
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boundary (i.e., zero); Otherwise, it is positive. Thus, we have the following housing market-clearing
condition: 
hiCHi  Ai if p
H
i > 0,
hiCHi ≤ Ai if pHi  0,
∀i. (C.4.4)
From (C.4.3), pHi , 0 for any long-run equilibria; because C
A
i →∞ and thus U →∞ as pHi → 0, such
a spatial pattern is never sustainable. We thus conclude that
CHi 
Ai
hi
, pHi  γ
yihi
Ai
(C.4.5)
and that hi > 0 at any long-run equilibrium.
Landownership. Wehere consider two typesof assumptionson landownership: public landownership
(abbreviated as PL) and local landownership (LL). In the original formulation, housing stocks are equally
owned by all workers (i.e., PL). In this way, the income of a worker in region i is the sum of the wage
and dividend of rental revenue, yi  wi + w¯H, where
w¯H 
1
H
∑
i∈K
pHi C
H
i hi 
γ
H
∑
i∈K
yihi , (C.4.6)
meaning that rearrangement yields
w¯H 
γ
(1 − γ)H
∑
i∈K
wihi . (C.4.7)
We set w¯H  1 to normalize wi to satisfy
∑
i∈K wihi  (µ/γ)H. On the contrary, Ottaviano et al. (2002),
Murata and Thisse (2005), and Redding and Sturm (2008) assumed that housing stocks are locally
owned (i.e., LL). Hence, yi  wi + wHi , where w¯i  p
H
i C
H
i  γyi , which in turn yields yi  wi/µ. Also
for this case, analogous to the PL case, we constrain w by using the condition
∑
i∈K wihi  (µ/γ)H
for normalization purposes.
Short-run equilibrium. Regarding the short-run equilibrium conditions, the only diﬀerence from
the Km model is the total expenditure in each region, which is now
Yi 

(wi + 1)hi , (for PL),
wihi/µ, (for LL).
(C.4.8)
The short-run equilibrium wage equation is thus given by
[PL] wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
di jw1−σi hi∑
k∈K dk jw1−σk hk
(w j + 1)h j , (C.4.9)
[LL] wihi 
∑
j∈K
di jw1−σi hi∑
k∈K dk jw1−σk hk
w jh j . (C.4.10)
63
Given the solution w for (C.4.9) or (C.4.9), indirect utility v(h) is expressed as
vi(h) 

κ¯ ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi + 1] − γ
(
ln[hi] − ln[Ai]
)
, (for PL),
κ¯ ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi] − γ
(
ln[hi] − ln[Ai]
)
, (for LL)
, (C.4.11)
where ∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K h jw1−σj d ji .
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let Ai  A for all regions to abstract from the location-
fixed exogenous eﬀects. For the PL case, we can show that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
{
κ¯D¯ + µ(µI − D¯) [σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 D¯(I − D¯) − γI} (C.4.12)

σ
h
[
σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 {−γI + (κ¯ + κ)D¯ + {γ − (µκ¯ + 1
σ
)}
D¯2
}
, (C.4.13)
meaning that ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c0  −γ, c1  µ ( 1σ−1 + 1σ ) , and c2  γ − 1σ − µ2σ−1 . Recall
that γ is the expenditure share of housing goods. Hence, the dispersion force expressed by c0 < 0
solely arises from local housing. For the LL case, we can show that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
{
κ¯D¯ + µ(I − D¯) [σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1 D¯ − γI} (C.4.14)

σ
h
[σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1
{
−γI +
(
µ
σ − 1 +
µ
σ
− γσ − 1
σ
)
D¯
}
. (C.4.15)
From this, we conclude that for the LL case ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ with c0  −γ and c1  µσ−1 + µσ − γ σ−1σ .
Remark C.3. For the model, the condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is given by γσ 
(1 − µ)σ > 1 (Redding and Sturm, 2008). If γσ > 1 is satisfied, regardless of the assumption on
landownership, the flat-earth equilibrium is stable.
Remark C.4. The regional model formulated in §3 of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) is an
enhanced version of the Hm model with LL, in which the variable input of skilled labor is allowed
to depend on region i (i.e., productivity diﬀers across regions). That is, the cost function of firms in
region i becomes
Ci(xi(ξ))  wi(α + βixi(ξ)). (C.4.16)
This then implies that the short-run equilibrium price and price index in region i become
pi j(ξ)  σβiσ − 1τi jwi , (C.4.17)
Pi 
σ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
h j(β jw jτ ji)1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.4.18)
64
respectively. As the model assumes LL, the wage equation for the model is
wihi 
∑
j∈K
hiAiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkAkw1−σk dk j
w jh j , (C.4.19)
where Ai ≡ β1−σi . Thus, by abstracting from first natures by setting Ai  A¯, the model reduces to the
Hm model under LL.
C.5 Puga (1999) (Pg) model
Puga (1999) generalized theKmmodel in twodirections, namely (i) the inter-sectormobility ofworkers
between the A-sector and the M-sector (without immobile workers but land) and (ii) intermediate
inputs in the M-sector, both as in Krugman and Venables (1995).
Assumptions. There is only a mass H of mobile workers, with hi denoting the number of workers
in region i. We denote by hMi and h
A
i the numbers of workers engaged in the M- and A-sectors,
respectively (hi  hMi + h
A
i ). The homogeneous preference of consumers is the same as in the
Km model, with the expenditure share of the M-sector good µ and elasticity of substitution between
manufactured varieties σ. Each region is endowedwithAi units of land owned by immobile landlords
that have the same preference as the workers. We assume that if a worker relocates, then he or she
first enters theM-sector of the destination region. The stability of the spatial pattern h is then reduced
to the study of hM ≡ [hMi ].
A-sector. TheA-sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous output by using labor
and land under constant returns to scale. A-sector goods are costless to trade and set as the numéraire.
Let XAi be the gross regional product of the A-sector. In line with the original study, we specify a
Cobb–Douglas production function with labor share µ¯; in concrete terms, we have XAi  (hAi )µ¯A
1−µ¯
i .
This implies that the total labor costs of A-sector firms are given by µ¯XAi  wih
A
i , while their land
costs ( the total rental revenue of landlords) are (1 − µ¯)XAi  1−µ¯µ¯ wihAi . In particular, labor demand
in this sector is given by a function of the wage hAi  Ai(wi/µ¯)1/(µ¯−1), because wi  µ¯(hAi /Ai)µ¯−1. Let
hAi  ϵih
M
i , meaning that hi  (1+ ϵi)hMi ; we here consider the case hMi , 0, because we are interested
in the stability of complete dispersion. We also have ϵi ≡ (Ai/hMi )(wi/µ¯)1/(µ¯−1). The regional rental
revenue from land, Ri , in terms of hMi is
Ri ≡ 1 − µ¯µ¯ ϵiwih
M
i . (C.5.1)
By employing the above formulae, the elasticity νi of a region’s labor supply to the M-sector with
respect to wage is
νi ≡ wi
hMi
∂hMi
∂wi

hAi
hMi
1
1 − µ¯  ϵi
1
1 − µ¯ . (C.5.2)
Further, if µ¯  0, XAi  Ai as well as Ri  Ai and ϵi  0.
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M-sector. By considering the simplest possible model of intermediate inputs as in Krugman and
Venables (1995), the minimum cost function of the M-sector is replaced by
C(xi(ξ))  P µˆi w
1−µˆ
i (α + βxi(ξ)), (C.5.3)
where Pi is the price index of M-sector goods in region i and µˆ the share of intermediates in firms’
costs. The profit-maximizing price is given by
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1P
µˆ
i w
1−µˆ
i τi j , (C.5.4)
which, togetherwith the definition of Pi , implies thatwe should solve a systemof non-linear equations
to obtain Pi . In concrete terms, the price indices {Pi} should satisfy
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(∑
j∈K
n j
(
P µˆj w
1−µˆ
j
)1−σ
d ji
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.5.5)
where di j ≡ τ1−σi j . We must solve (C.5.5) along with the wage equation to be defined below.
In line with the Km model, the ZPC of firms implies xi(ξ)  α(σ − 1)/β. Firms’ minimized
production cost in region i is then given by Ci  (ασ)P µˆi w
1−µˆ
i , meaning that labor demand in the
M-sector of region i is
hMi  (1 − µˆ)
Ci
wi
ni  ασ(1 − µˆ)P µˆi w
−µˆ
i ni . (C.5.6)
The mass of varieties produced in region i is thus given as follows:
ni 
1
ασ(1 − µˆ)P
−µˆ
i w
µˆ
i h
M
i . (C.5.7)
For simplicity, in the following, as in the original study, we normalize the constants such that α  1/σ
and β  (σ − 1)/σ. Then, by plugging (C.5.7) to (C.5.5), we have
P1−σi 
1
1 − µˆ
∑
j∈K
hMj P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j d ji . (C.5.8)
Land is locally owned by immobile landlords that share the same preference as mobile workers; their
regional expenditure on M-sector goods is given by µRi . In addition, the regional expenditure of
firms on intermediates is given by
µˆCini 
µˆ
1 − µˆwih
M
i . (C.5.9)
Total expenditure in region i on M-sector goods is Yi  µwihi + µRi + µˆCini . By using (C.5.1) as well
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as hi  (1 + ϵi)hMi , this is simplified to
Yi  µ(1 + ϵi)wihMi + µRi +
µˆ
1 − µˆwih
M
i 
[
µ
(
1 +
ϵi
µ¯
)
+
µˆ
1 − µˆ
]
wihMi . (C.5.10)
From the ZPC of firms, the wage equation for the model is given by62
1
1 − µˆwih
M
i︸        ︷︷        ︸
M-sector firms’ total cost

∑
j∈K
hMi P
−µˆσ
i w
1−σ+µˆσ
i di j∑
k∈K hMk P
−µˆσ
k w
1−σ+µˆσ
k dk j
[
µ
(
1 +
ϵ j
µ¯
)
+
µˆ
1 − µˆ
]
w jhMj︸                                                                       ︷︷                                                                       ︸
M-sector firms’ total revenue
.. (C.5.11)
The short-run wage w  (wi) and price index P  (Pi) are obtained as the solution for the system of
non-linear equations (C.5.8) and (C.5.11). We require µˆ < σ−1σ , meaning that P and w are uniquely
determined for any transportation cost.
Given P and w, the indirect utility function is
vi(h)  µσ − 1 ln[∆i] + ln[wi] (C.5.12)
with ∆i 
∑
j∈K hMj P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j d ji .
Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let Ai  A for all i and consider the
flat-earth equilibrium. Let h ≡ H/K be the uniform number of mobile agents; let also hM and hA be
the number of mobile agents engaged in the M- and A-sectors, respectively. Further, let Y¯, P¯, w¯, Ω¯,
and ϵ¯ be the uniform level of regional expenditure, price index, wage, Ωi , and ratio ϵi of hAi to h
M
i
at the flat-earth equilibrium, respectively. By adding up the wage equations (C.5.11) at the flat-earth
equilibrium, we show
ϵ¯ 
hA
hM
 µ¯
1 − µ
µ
. (C.5.13)
A larger µ¯ (µ) implies a larger (smaller) ϵ¯  hA/hM, which is intuitive. The explicit formula of ϵ¯ yields
Y¯ 
w¯
1 − µˆ
ϵ¯
1 + ϵ¯
h , w¯  µ¯
(
h
A
ϵ¯
1 + ϵ¯
) µ¯−1
. (C.5.14)
Together with the fact that ϵ¯/µ¯  µ1−µ , µ¯ does not aﬀect the stability of h¯ but rather scales total global
income. We also have P¯  ρw¯, where ρ ≡ {(hMd)(1 − µˆ)}1/(1−σ+µˆσ) with d being the row sum of D
and ∆i  ∆¯ ≡ (1 − µˆ)P¯1−σ. Note that at the equilibrium, we have
1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂hMi
 − 1
µ¯
ϵ¯
hM
 − 1
hM
1 − µ
µ
. (C.5.15)
62The original analyses in Puga (1999) allow a positive profit of firms. In this appendix, we adhere to the
ZPC so that comparisons with the other models are possible.
67
In addition, with ν¯ ≡ µ¯1−µ¯ 1−µµ being the elasticity of labor supply from the A-sector to the M-sector
with respect to wi ,
∂hMi
∂wi
 ν¯
hM
wi
,
1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂wi

1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂hM
∂hMi
∂wi
 −ν¯ 1
wi
1 − µ
µ
. (C.5.16)
We also assume that ∂hi/∂hMi  ∂hMi /∂hi  1 as discussed. It follows that, at h¯,
∂Yi
∂hMi

(
µˆ
1 − µˆ + µ
)
w¯ ,
∂Yi
∂wi

(
1
1 − µˆ + (1 − µ)ν¯
)
hM. (C.5.17)
The Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function is computed as
∂vi
∂h j

µ
σ − 1
1
∆i
(
∂∆i
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂Pk
∂Pk
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+ δi , j
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
, (C.5.18)
where δi , j is Kronecker’s delta; below, we evaluate ∇∆ ≡ [∂∆i/∂h j], ∇P∆ ≡ [∂∆i/∂P j], ∇w∆ ≡
[∂∆i/∂w j], ∇P ≡ [∂Pi/∂h j], and ∇w ≡ [∂wi/∂h j].
For ∇∆, ∇P∆, and ∇w∆, we compute as follows: ∇∆  ∆¯(hM)−1D¯, ∇w∆  ∆¯w¯−1aD¯, as well as
∇P∆  ∆¯P¯−1bD¯, with a ≡ 1 − σ + µˆσ and b ≡ −µˆσ. Thus, at the flat-earth pattern, ∇v(h¯) is
∇v(h¯)  µ
σ − 1
(
1
hM
D¯ +
1
P¯
bD¯∇P
)
+
1
w¯
(
I +
µa
σ − 1D¯
)
∇w. (C.5.19)
The remaining task is to evaluate ∇P and ∇w. First, by totally diﬀerentiating the definition of the
price index (C.5.8), we have ∇QdhM + ∇wQdw + ∇PQdP  0with
∇PQ ≡ [(σ − 1)I + bD¯] , ∇hQ ≡ P¯hM D¯, ∇wQ ≡ a
P¯
w¯
D¯. (C.5.20)
In addition, the total diﬀerentiation of the wage equation implies ∇WdhM +∇wWdw+∇PWdP  0
with
∇wW ≡ hMI − (1 − µˆ)
[
a
1
w¯
Y¯(I − D¯2) + ∂Y¯
∂w
D¯
]
, (C.5.21)
∇hW ≡ w¯I − (1 − µˆ)
[
1
hM
Y¯(I − D¯2) + ∂Y¯
∂hM
D¯
]
, (C.5.22)
∇PW ≡ −(1 − µˆ)b 1P¯ Y¯(I − D¯
2)∇P . (C.5.23)
We have already computed Y¯, ∂Y¯/∂w, and ∂Y¯/∂hM. These relations yield the analytical expressions
for the Jacobian matrices ∇P and ∇w:
∇P  −[∇wQ∇PW − ∇PQ∇wW ]−1[∇wQ∇hW − ∇hQ∇wW ], (C.5.24)
∇w  [∇wQ∇PW − ∇PQ∇wW ]−1[∇PQ∇hW − ∇hQ∇PW ]. (C.5.25)
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Summing up the computations up to here, patient computation yields
∇v(h¯)  J−10
[
µˇ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ −
(
µˇ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
+ ω
)
D¯2
]
, (C.5.26)
where J0 is a positive definitematrix defined by D¯, µˇ ≡ µˆ+µ(1− µˆ), which is loosely interpreted as the
aggregate expenditure share of M-sector goods, and ω ≡ µ(1−µˇ)σ(σ−1) (1 − ν¯) is a constant that summarizes
the eﬀects of labor mobility between the A- and M-sectors at h¯. Thus, ∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with
c1  µˇ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
> 0, (C.5.27)
c2  −
( µˇ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
+ ω
)
< 0. (C.5.28)
C.6 Tabuchi (1998) (Tb) model
The Tb model introduces the internal structure of regions to the Km model. The main thrust of this
model is that unlike themajority of regionalmodels, the city boundary in each region is endogenously
determined by the full-fledged monocentric city model of Alonso–Muth–Mills. This produces a rich
structure of urban costs, because the tradeoﬀ between commuting costs and land rents is explicit.
In this model, we have the previous three sectors (M, H, and A). The internal structure of each
region is featureless, except that it is endowed with a single central business district (CBD) with
negligible spatial extent. In each region, locations are indexed by the distance from the CBD, x ≥ 0.
At any point, the land endowment density is assumed to be unity. The total numbers of skilled and
unskilled workers are given by H and L, respectively. The number of skilled workers in region i is
denoted by hi , whereas the spatial distribution (density) in that region is, allowing notational abuse,
denoted by hi(x). Thus, we have ∫ x¯i
0
hi(x)dx  hi , (C.6.1)
where x¯i ≥ 0 is the city boundary in region i that is endogenously determined. Unskilled workers
are employed by the A-sector and do not commute to the CBD, whereas skilled workers do. A skilled
worker at distance x from the CBD incurs the generalized cost of commuting T(x), which is measured
by the numéraire.
Preference. The utility of a representative worker living in region i and located at x is given by
U(CMi , CHi , CAi )  µ lnCMi + γ lnCHi + (1 − µ − γ) lnCAi , (C.6.2)
where µ and γ with µ + γ < 1 are the constant expenditure shares for M-sector goods and H-sector
goods, respectively; CMi is theCESaggregate ofM-sector goodsdefinedby (C.1.2),C
H
i the consumption
of housing space (H-sector goods), CAi the consumption of agricultural products (A-sector goods) in
region i. M-sector goods are subject to iceberg transport costs, whereas those of the A-sector are
not for both intra- and interregional transportation. H-sector goods are local and non-tradable. By
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choosing A-sector goods as the numéraire, the budget constraint of a skilled worker at location x in
region i is
CAi + ri(x)CHi (x) +
∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ + Ti(x)  yi , (C.6.3)
where ri(x) is the land rent prevailing at location x in region i, T(x) the generalized cost of commuting
from location x to the CBD, and yi the income of theworker. We assume that T(x) is diﬀerentiable and
increasing in x with T(0)  0. Note that T(x) is independent of its population and is homogeneous
among the regions. Given the price including the land rent profile {ri(x)}, utility maximization yields
CMi (x)  µ
yi(x)
Pi
, CHi (x)  γ
yi(x)
ri(x) , C
A
i (x)  (1 − µ − γ)yi(x), q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi , (C.6.4)
where yi(x)  yi − T(x) is the net income of a worker residing at x in region i. Following the
tradition of urban economics, the model assumes absentee landowners who keep the rental revenue
of housing, leading to yi  wi for every skilled worker. Unskilled workers live outside the city and
do not commute to the CBD. Thus, they face the agricultural land rent rA > 0 and zero commuting
cost as well as yi  1. For simplicity, we assume that rA is the same across the regions. We also
assume that the intracity transportation of M-sector goods is costless, meaning that unskilled and
skilled workers face the same M-sector product price.
Internal structure of each region. As discussed, the diﬀerence compared with the Km model is that
the internal structure of each region is now explicitly modeled by a monocentric city model. The
standard first-order condition for the equilibrium spatial pattern is that
CHi (x)
dri(x)
dx
+
dT(x)
dx
 0 (C.6.5)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯ with the boundary condition being ri(x¯)  rA. In the following, we focus on a single
region given the fixed values of wi and hi . For simplicity, we omit index i unless otherwise noted. By
combining CHi (x) in (C.6.4), we obtain the land rent profile r(x) given w:
r(x)  rˆ{1 − T(x)/w}1/γ (C.6.6)
with r(x¯)  rA at the city boundary x¯ of the region. Thus, rˆ, the land rent at the CBD (x  0) when
the city boundary is at x¯ and wage rate is w, is determined as
rˆ(x¯ , w)  r
A
{1 − T(x¯)/w}1/γ . (C.6.7)
We observe that rˆ  rAwhen hi  0 because x¯  0 andT(0)  0. With notational abuse, the population
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density function h(x) in the region for the given x¯ and w becomes
h(x)  a(x)
CH(x) 
a(x)r(x)
γy(x) 
rˆ(x¯ , w)
γw
a(x){1 − T(x)/w}1/γ−1 , (C.6.8)
where a(x) is the land endowment at distance x. We here note that as r(x¯)  rA,
h(x¯)  a(x¯)r
A
γ(w − T(x¯)) . (C.6.9)
In Tabuchi (1998), it is assumed that a(x)  2pix, meaning that the city is disk-shaped.
Comparative statistics for the internal structure of a region. Before studying the stability of the flat-
earth equilibrium at the regional scale, we first investigate how changes in hi and wi aﬀect the internal
structure of a region. We note that the population density function h(x) satisfies
∂h(x)
∂x¯

T′(x¯)
γ(w − T(x¯))h(x) > 0 (C.6.10)
∂h(x)
∂w

(
1 − γ
γ(w − T(x)) −
1
γ(w − T(x¯))
)
h(x) < 0 (C.6.11)
provided that w − T(x¯) > 0, which must be the case because otherwise the utility of an agent at x¯
becomes negative infinity. The latter inequality states that, as is standard in the literature, population
density decreases as income increases. Define the function H(x¯ , w) that returns the population in the
interval [0, x¯) by
H(x¯ , w) 
∫ x¯
0
h(x)dx. (C.6.12)
Then, the location of the city boundary x¯ for the given h and w is determined by the equation
h  H(x¯ , w), (C.6.13)
where x¯ becomes a function of h and w. For later use, we investigate the eﬀects of h and w on x¯. By
applying the implicit function theorem to the equation H(x¯ , w) − h  0, we have
∂x¯
∂h

1
h(x¯) and
∂x¯
∂w
 − 1
h(x¯)
∂H
∂w
, (C.6.14)
where we assume that w is determined in the region-scale trade balance, meaning that w and h are
the independent variables. Note that ∂H/∂x¯  h(x¯). From (C.6.11), we have
∂H
∂w

∫ x¯
0
∂h(x)
∂w
dx < 0, (C.6.15)
which suggests that the population in the interval [0, x¯) decreases when income increases. Then,
from (C.6.14), we conclude that (i) the city boundary x¯ is increasing in wi and (ii) x¯ is increasing in
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hi . Thus, we see that x¯ is increasing in both hi and wi , which is standard. In addition, define the total
(generalized) costs incurred by commuting in the region by
Ti 
∫ x¯
0
T(x)h(x)dx. (C.6.16)
Then, we can show that
∂Ti
∂h
 T(x¯) + υ
h(x¯)Ti > 0,
∂Ti
∂w
 −∂Ti
∂h
∂H
∂w
> 0, (C.6.17)
where υ is the elasticity of land rent at the city boundary x¯:
υ ≡ − r
′(x¯)
r(x¯) 
T′(x¯)
γ(w − T(x¯)) . (C.6.18)
Thus, the total commuting cost increases in both hi and wi ceteris paribus, which is also standard.
Short-run equilibrium. Consider the regional scale and recover the region indices. Given x¯i , total
expenditure in region i net of commuting costs is given by Yi  wihi − Ti + li . The wage equation for
the model is given by
wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(w jh j − T j + l j). (C.6.19)
We impose the following constraint on w for normalization purposes:∑
i∈K
(wihi − Ti)  µ
1 − µL, (C.6.20)
where Ti depends on both hi and wi . Given the short-runwage, indirect utility for region i is obtained
by evaluating it at the CBD (x  0) since utility is equalized in each region:
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[yi(x¯i)] (C.6.21)
where ∆i 
∑
j∈K h jw1−σj d ji and yi(x¯i)  wi − T(x¯i).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We compute as follows:
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 − µM⊤∇w(h) diag[w]−1 + diag[yi(x¯i)]−1∇[yi(x¯i)] (C.6.22)
withM defined in line with the Kmmodel and ∇[yi(x¯i)]  ∇w(h)−∇ diag[T(x¯i)], where we note that
∇ diag[T(x¯i)]  diag[T′(x¯i)]∇[x¯i(hi , wi)]  diag[T′(x¯i)]
{
diag[∂x¯i/∂hi] + diag[∂x¯i/∂wi]∇w(h)
}
.
Thus, by lettingΨ0 ≡ diag[T′(x¯i)∂x¯i/∂hi] andΨ1 ≡ diag[T′(x¯i)∂x¯i/∂wi], we have
∇[yi(x¯i)]  ∇w(h) − (Ψ0 +Ψ1∇w(h))  −Ψ0 + (I −Ψ1)∇w(h). (C.6.23)
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As in the Km model, ∇w  [∂/∂wi]. For ∇w(h), we have ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇wW  diag[h] + µ(σ − 1)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 − µM∇wY , (C.6.24)
∇W  diag[w] − µ(diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[h]−1 − µM∇Y (C.6.25)
where Y  [Yi]  [wihi − Ti + li], ∇wY  diag[h] − ∇wT , and ∇Y  diag[w] − ∇T .
Consider the flat-earth equilibrium in a symmetric racetrack economy with li  l. Let w¯ and T¯ be
the uniform level of the nominal wage rate and total commuting cost in each region. Note that T¯ is a
function of w¯ and x¯. Given the commuting cost function T(x) and location of the city boundary and
wage (x¯ , w¯), at the flat-earth equilibrium, we require
w¯h − T¯(x¯ , w¯)  µ
1 − µ l (C.6.26)
so that wages are normalized. Then, we can show that there exists a unique positive solution (x¯∗ , w¯∗)
such that w¯∗ − T(x¯∗) > 0 for the system of non-linear equations defined by (C.6.13) and (C.6.26) for
the given h. By employing the solution (x¯∗ , w¯∗), total income in Y is given by Y¯  l/(1 − µ). Define
the ratios φ of the regional disposable income of skilled workers and φˆ of regional total expenditure
to the total nominal wage:
φ ≡ w¯h − T¯
w¯h
, φˆ ≡ Y¯
w¯h
. (C.6.27)
The latter implies that Y¯/w¯  φˆh and Y¯/h  φˆw¯. Given (x¯∗ , w∗), we define the T(x)-dependent
positive constants ψ0, ψ1, ρ0, and ρ1 such thatΨ0  ψ0I,Ψ1  ψ1I, ∇Y  ρ0w¯I, and ∇wY  ρ1hI.
Then, we can calculate the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium as
follows:
∇v(h¯)  h−1κ¯D¯ − w¯−1µD¯∇w(h¯) − y¯−1ψ0I + y¯−1(1 − ψ1)∇w(h¯), (C.6.28)
 h−1κ¯D¯ − y¯−1ψ0I + { y¯−1(1 − ψ1)I − w¯−1µD¯}∇w(h¯), (C.6.29)
where y¯ ≡ y(x¯∗)  w¯∗ − T(x¯∗) is the net wage at x¯∗ and ∇w(h¯)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇W  −w¯ [ − (1 − φˆµ)I + ρ0µD¯ − φˆµD¯2] , , (C.6.30)
∇wW  h
[{
φˆµ(σ − 1) + 1}I − ρ1µD¯ − φˆµ(σ − 1)D¯2] . (C.6.31)
Illustration. Following Tabuchi (1998), we investigate the simplest case where the commuting cost
function is linear with respect to distance: T(x)  tx. We also simplify the analysis by assuming that
the internal structure of each region is one-dimensional and extends symmetrically around the CBD
over the interval [−x¯ , x¯] á la Murata and Thisse (2005). Although this change strengthens the role of
urban costs in each region, it does not aﬀect the intrinsic properties of the model. For this case, By
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letting a(x)  1, we obtain
x¯ 
1
t
(1 − ϵγ)w¯ , (C.6.32)
where the non-dimensional constant ϵ ∈ (0, 1) is defined by ϵ ≡ (1+ tˆh)−1. The parameter tˆ ≡ (t/2)/rA
is interpreted as a measure of the relative magnitude of commuting costs to land rents. As expected,
x¯ is decreasing in the generalized commuting cost per distance t. Then, solving (C.6.26) implies that
w¯ 
1
φ
· µ
1 − µ ·
L
H
and φ  1
1 + γ
· 1 − ϵ
1+γ
1 − ϵ (C.6.33)
as well as y¯  ϵγw¯, Y¯  l/(1 − µ), and φˆ  φ/µ. Then, we also have
ψ0  T′(x¯)∂x¯∂h  h
−1 y¯γ(1 − ϵ), ψ1  T′(x¯) ∂x¯∂w  1 − ϵ
γ , (C.6.34)
ρ0 
1
w¯
∂Yi
∂hi

1
w¯
(
wi − ∂Ti∂hi
)
 1 − γ(1 − ϵ)φ, ρ1  1h
∂Yi
∂wi

1
h
(
hi − ∂Ti∂wi
)
 φ. (C.6.35)
Summarizing computations up to here yields the analytical expression of ∇v(h¯) as follows:
∇v(h¯)  h−1κ¯D¯ + (I − µD¯)w¯−1∇w(h¯) − h−1γˆI , (C.6.36)
∇w(h¯)  w¯h−1 [cˆ0I + cˆ1D¯ + cˆ2D¯2]−1 [c¯0I + c¯1D¯ + c¯2D¯2] (C.6.37)
with the coeﬃcients being

cˆ0 ≡ 1 + (σ − 1)φ > 0,
cˆ1 ≡ −µφ < 0,
cˆ2 ≡ −(σ − 1)φ < 0,

c¯0 ≡ −(1 − φ) < 0,
c¯1 ≡ µ(1 − γˆφ) > 0,
c¯2 ≡ −φ < 0
(C.6.38)
where γˆ ≡ γ(1 − ϵ). Note that φ and γˆ together summarize the net eﬀects of the two types of
urban costs; φ and γˆ represent those from commuting and non-tradable land, respectively. As a
consequence, we have ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with
c0  −γˆ
(
1
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
φ
)
< 0, (C.6.39)
c1  µ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
> 0, (C.6.40)
c2  −
[
µ2
σ − 1
(
φ
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
(1 − γˆφ)
)
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
:ω0
+
1
σ
φ − γˆφ σ − 1
σ︸             ︷︷             ︸
:ω1/σ
]
≡ −
(
µ2
σ − 1ω0 +
1
σ
ω1
)
. (C.6.41)
Remark C.5. Observe that if tˆ and γ are both infinitesimally small so that there are virtually no urban
costs, we have γˆ  γ(1 − ϵ) ≈ 0(1 − 1)  0 and φ ≈ (1 + γ)−1 ≈ 1. Then, the coeﬃcients c0, c1, and c2
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reduce to those of the Km model, which is intuitive. We note that for general cases, the sign of c2 is
ambiguous. In particular, if γ is large relative to µ and in addition 1− ϵ is small (tˆ or h is small), c2 can
be positive. This is because while housing is important relative to manufactured goods, commuting
costs are quite low; this implies that a concentration of skilled workers is beneficial despite higher
market competition on the side of firms.
C.7 Pflüger and Südekum (2008) (PS) model
The PS model builds on Pflüger (2004), with the only diﬀerence being that it introduces the housing
sector (again denoted by H), which produces a local dispersion force.
Preference. The homogeneous preference of skilled workers is given by the following quasilinear
form with respect to the A-sector good (numéraire):
U(CMi , CHi , CAi )  µ lnCAi + γ lnCHi + CAi , (C.7.1)
where CMi , C
H
i , and C
A
i are again the consumption of manufacturing aggregates, C
H
i housing goods,
and CAi agricultural goods, respectively. Then, the indirect utility of a skilled worker in region i is
obtained as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] − γ(ln[hi + li] − lnAi) + wi , (C.7.2)
where ∆i 
∑
j∈K d jih j , and li and Ai denote the number of unskilled workers and amount of housing
stock in region i, respectively. The nominal wage in region i is given by
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j
∆ j
(h j + l j) (C.7.3)
as in the Pf model.
Jacobian matrix. At the flat-earth equilibrium with li  l and Ai  A for all i, we can show
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [−γ(1 + ϵ)−1I + (κ¯ + κ)D¯ − κ(1 + ϵ)D¯2] , (C.7.4)
where ϵ ≡ L/H is the ratio of the total number of unskilled workers to that of skilled workers. We
thus conclude that c0  −γ(1 + ϵ)−1 < 0, c1  κ¯ + κ > 0, and c2  −κ(1 + ϵ) < 0.
Numerical simulation. Figure 11 and Figure 12 assume Pflüger and Südekum (2008)’s model. The
parameters are set to µ  0.4, σ  2.5, L  4, H  1, γ  0.5, and A  1.
C.8 Murata and Thisse (2005) (MT) model
Similar to the Tb model, Murata and Thisse (2005) studied the interplay between commuting costs
and interregional transport costs by employing a simplified yet reasonable specification. The internal
structure of each region is assumed to be one-dimensional and featureless except that there is a given
75
CBD; the city expands symmetrically around the origin. There are only skilled and mobile workers,
who choose their own residential region i and location x ≥ 0 in that region, where the CBD is located
at x  0. The total number of skilled workers is fixed and assumed to be H.
The internal structure of a region. Land endowment equals unity everywhere in a region andworkers
are assumed to inelastically consume one unit of land. The opportunity cost of land is normalized to
zero in every region. Then, the city spreads in the intervalXi ≡ [−x¯i , x¯i], where x¯i ≡ hi/2 denotes the
city boundary. Commuting costs take an iceberg form. Specifically, a worker located at x supplies
s(x)  1 − 4θ |x | x ∈ Xi (C.8.1)
unit of labor, where we require θ ∈ [0, 1/(2H)) so that we have s(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and for all region
i at any configuration. Then, total eﬀective labor supply in the CBD of region i is given by
Si 
∫
Xi
s(x)dx  hi(1 − θhi). (C.8.2)
Note that Si  hi when commuting is costless: θ  0. Letting ri(x) be the land rent profile, at the
equilibrium, this must satisfy
s(x)wi − ri(x)  w¯i , ∀x ∈ Xi , (C.8.3)
where w¯i ≡ s(x¯i)wi − ri(x¯i)  s(x¯i)wi  s(−x¯i)wi  (1 − 2θhi)wi is the disposable wage level of a
worker located at the boundary of the city. We thus have
ri(x)  2θ(hi − 2|x |)wi , ∀x ∈ Xi , (C.8.4)
which means that the aggregate land rent in region i is
Ri ≡
∫
Xi
ri(x)dx  θwih2i . (C.8.5)
Land is locally owned, and thus the income of a worker in region i and any location x is
yi  s(x)wi − ri(x) + Rihi  w¯i + θwihi  (1 − θhi)wi . (C.8.6)
Preference. The homogeneous preference of skilled workers in region i is given by
U(CMi )  lnCMi , (C.8.7)
where, as usual, CMi is the consumption of theCES aggregate defined by (C.1.2). The budget constraint
of a mobile worker becomes ∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.8.8)
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where yi denotes the income of the worker. It is immediately obvious that given yi , utility maximiza-
tion yields
CMi 
yi
Pi
, q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi , (C.8.9)
where Pi is the price index in region i.
Firms. Manufacturing firms are assumed to be the same as in the Km model. Specifically, to
produce xi units of a good, a firm requires α+ βxi units of skilled labor. Thus, the cost function faced
by a firm in region i is given by Ci(xi)  wi(α + βxi). Profit maximization yields pi j(ξ) as in the Km
model (C.1.10), which does not depend on ξ. Noting that the number of firms ni in region i is given
by ni  Si/(α + βx∗i )  (ασ)−1Si , the price index in region i is given as
Pi 
βσ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
S jw1−σj d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(C.8.10)
with di j  τ1−σi j and Si  (1 − θhi)hi .
Short-run equilibrium. Noting that aggregate income in region i is given by Yi  wiSi , the wage
equation for the MT model becomes
wiSi 
∑
j∈K
Siw1−σi di j∑
k∈K Skw1−σk dk j
w jS j . (C.8.11)
To normalize w, we assume
∑
i∈K wiSi  W > 0. Given the solution w to the equation, the indirect
utility of workers in region i is obtained as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi] + ln[1 − θhi], (C.8.12)
where κ¯  1/(σ − 1) and ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K hi(1 − θhi)w1−σk dki .
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We compute as follows:
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[S]−1 diag[1 − 2θhi] + (I −M ) diag[w]−1∇w(h) − θ diag[1 − θhi]−1 (C.8.13)
where ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇wW  diag[S] + (σ − 1)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 −M diag[S] (C.8.14)
∇W  [diag[w] − (diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[S]−1 −M diag[w]] diag[1 − 2θhi] (C.8.15)
with Y  [Yi]  [wi(1−θhi)hi] andS  [Si]  [(1−θhi)hi]. Note that Yi  wiSi . Assume a symmetric
racetrack economy. We have
∇wW  (1 − θh)h
[
σI + (σ − 1)D¯] [I − D¯] , (C.8.16)
∇W  −w¯(1 − 2θh)D¯ [I − D¯] , (C.8.17)
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which in turn yields
∇v(h)  1 − 2θh(1 − θh)h
( [
σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ − θh
1 − 2θh I
)
. (C.8.18)
As a consequence, we obtain ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯, where, with θˆ ≡ (θh)/(1 − 2θh),
c0  −θˆ, c1  (1 − θˆ)
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
− θˆ σ − 1
σ
. (C.8.19)
Remark C.6. Wemust require that 0 ≤ θˆ < 1/{2(K − 1)} < 1 to ensure that Si is positive for all region
i. In particular, when H  1 and K  2, meaning that h  1/2 as in the original study, we have
θˆ  θ/{2(1− θ)} and θˆ ∈ (0, 1/2). Moreover, by letting γ ≡ θˆ and µ ≡ 1− θˆ, the model is isomorphic
to Helpman (1998)’s model with LL, albeit there is a restriction on γ.
C.9 Harris and Wilson (1978) (HW) model
TheHWmodel is an archetypal economic geographymodel formulated in the field of geographywell
before mainstream economists started to emphasize the self-organization of the spatial allocation of
economic activity. The model has fruitful applications in urban planning. A detailed analysis of the
model can be found in Osawa et al. (2017). The model can also be interpreted as a spatial competition
model with discrete locations but a continuum of firms.
Assumptions. We consider a city discretized into K zones and associated centroids. There is a
continuum of retailing firms in each zone that operate a shop. The number of firms in zone i is
denoted by hi ≥ 0; h denotes the spatial distribution of retailers. A fixed proportion of consumers
resides in each zone. Consumers are assumed to inelastically buy retail goods from some shop
located in the city. Total per capita consumer demand for a shopping activity in zone i is a constant
Oi . Consumers’ shopping behavior is captured by a set of origin-constrained gravity equations. For
any given h, consumer demand Si j(h) from zone i to j, measured as cash flow, is given by
Si j(h) 
hαj exp[−βti j]∑
k∈K hαk exp[−βtik]
Oi , (C.9.1)
where ti j is the travel cost from zone i to j. The parameters α, β > 0 are exogenous constants. The
term hαi is the attractiveness of the retailers in the zone i, where α determines the economies of scale.
We assume α > 1 and hence there is increasing returns to scale. β dictates how fast demand decreases
with the travel cost ti j (respecting the original formulation, this section uses β instead of τ). Note that
one may recast the demand function into the context of spatial competition by interpreting α−1 as the
magnitude of product diﬀerentiation.
Payoﬀ. The payoﬀ (profit) of a retailer in zone i is defined as follows:
Πi(h) 
∑
j∈K S ji(h)
hi
− κi , (C.9.2)
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where κi is the fixed cost of entry. Assume that Oi  1 and that κi  κ for all i. Then, we have
Π(h) M⊤ − κ1 labeleq : Pivec (C.9.3)
whereM ≡ diag[D diag[h]α1]−1D diag[h]α−1 with di j ≡ exp[−βti j].
Long-run equilibrium. The HW model is an open-city model. The total number of retailers at
an equilibrium is thus determined from the following equilibrium condition: hiΠi(h)  0, hi ≥
0, Πi(h) ≤ 0. However, at any equilibrium, we have ∑i∈K κihi  ∑i∈K Oi ; the set D ≡ {h ∈ RK |∑
i∈K κihi 
∑
i∈K Oi , hi ≥ 0} is globally attracting.
Dynamics. Harris and Wilson (1978) assumed that the spatial pattern h gradually evolves in
proportion to the profit Π(h) and the state h. Specifically, we define Ûh  F (h) ≡ diag[h] · Π(h) 
[Si(h) − κihi]
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. It is immediately clear that J  ∇F (h¯) is given by
J  κ
{(α − 1)I − αD¯2} , (C.9.4)
where I is the identity matrix and D¯ ≡ D/d with d ≡ ∑ j∈K d0, j . We see that J ≃ c0I + c2D¯2 with
c0  1 − 1α , c2  −1. (C.9.5)
It is clear that c0 reflects the magnitude of the local increasing return. c0 is positive as long as α > 1;
α < 1 yields that the flat-earth equilibrium is always stable. c2  −1 represents, analogous to the FO
model, firms’ competition over demand from immobile consumers.
C.10 Beckmann (1976) (Bm) model
We formulate a discrete-space version of Beckmann (1976)’s spatial model of social interactions.
Since the original formulation of Beckmann (1976) uses a linear communication cost, we introduce
suitable modifications. Yet, as long as every consumer communicates with all other consumers, our
modification does not alter the intrinsic properties of agglomeration and dispersion. In particular,
whether possible equilibria are unimodal or multimodal does not change. We also avoid unnecessary
complication and stick to the simplest possible specification.
Assumptions. Consider a city discretized into K areas. Each area i is endowed with fixed amount
Ai of housing stocks. Housing stocks are owned by absentee landlords. The city is endowed with
H homogeneous consumers that can choose his or her residential location and consume land and
composite goods. The income of consumers is a fixed constant Y, which is suﬃciently large.
Preference. In addition to land and composite goods, every consumer draws social utility because
of his or her communication with others. Specifically, everyone in area i draws the following social
utility:
Si(h)  log[∆i], (C.10.1)
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where ∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K di jh j with di j ≡ exp[−τℓi j]. Note that ∆i is an exponential accessibility function à la
Fujita and Ogawa (1982). Given the spatial distribution of consumers h, the utility of residing area i
takes the following quasilinear form:
Ui(zi , si ;h)  zi + γ log[si] + Si(h), (C.10.2)
where zi and si are the consumption of the composite and housing goods, respectively, and γ is an
exogenous constant. We set the composite good to the numéraire and the budget constraint of a
worker in area i is
Y  zi + risi , (C.10.3)
where utility maximization yields si  Ai/hi , ri  αhi/Ai , and zi  Y − γ. Then, by assuming Ai  1
in every area and removing the constants, indirect utility in area i is given by
vi(h)  log[∆i] − γ log[hi]. (C.10.4)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Assuming a racetrack economy, it is immediately clear
that the Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium is given by
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [ − γI + D¯] . (C.10.5)
We thus see that c0  −γ and c1  1 for the model. Without any location-fixed factors, Mossay and
Picard (2011) and Blanchet et al. (2016) are essentially the same model as the one presented here.
C.11 Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) (TA) model
Takayama andAkamatsu (2011) is a reduced-form partial equilibriummodel that introduces a spatial
competition eﬀect à la Harris and Wilson (1978) into the Bm model. Specifically, in essence, they
introduced firms that sell goods at a fixed price to spatially immobile consumers. The consumers in
the Bm model are now workers; each worker inelastically provides a single unit of labor.
Immobile consumers. In each area, li immobile consumers with
∑
i li  L demand a single unit of
goods produced by firms; immobile consumers are assumed to engage in jobs in other industries.
Given the spatial distribution n  (ni)i∈K of firms, demand from area j to i is given by the following
origin-constrained gravity equation:
q ji 
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jknk
l j (C.11.1)
with dˆi j ≡ exp[−τˆℓi j], whose microfoundation can be found at a CES preference or alternatively some
taste heterogeneity.
Firms. A manufacturing firm produces a single unit of a manufactured good at a fixed price µ,
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using a single unit of the labor of mobile consumers. Thus, we must have ni  hi . The profit function
of the firm at i is given by
Πi(h)  µ
∑
j∈K
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jkhk
l j − wi . (C.11.2)
For simplicity, we force zero profit for firms and abstract from commuting between diﬀerent areas.
Then, the wage of a mobile worker in area i equals
wi(h)  µ
∑
j∈K
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jkhk
l j , (C.11.3)
meaning that the indirect utility of the worker becomes
vi(h)  wi(h) + log[∆i] − γ log[hi]. (C.11.4)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let li  L/K for all i and assume that di j  dˆi j for all i
and j (i.e., τ  τˆ). Then, we compute as follows:
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [ − γI + D¯ − µϵD¯2] , (C.11.5)
where ϵ ≡ L/H. Hence, we see that c0  −γ, c1  1, and c2  −µϵ.
C.12 Allen and Arkolakis (2014) (AA) model
The AA model is formulated as a perfectly competitive Armington (1969)-based framework with
positive (production) and negative (congestion) reduced-form local agglomeration externalities. We
introduce a discrete-space version of the AA model, instead of the continuous-space version of the
original study, to fit our context.
Assumptions. A fixed number H of mobile consumers choose residents. We denote the spatial
pattern of consumers by h. In each region i, a unique diﬀerentiated variety of a good is produced
following Armington (1969). Production is assumed to be perfectly competitive and labor is the only
factor of production. Each mobile consumer inelastically supplies a single unit of labor. As usual, we
do not consider the commuting of workers between two regions. We denote the wage of workers by
w. The transportation of goods between regions takes an iceberg form; firms in i must export τi j > 0
units of the good to meet a single unit of demand in region j.
In each region, the total factor productivity (TFP) and amenity are directly aﬀected by the number
of inhabitants, hi . These externalities are local in the sense that they do not depend on the distance
between regions. The number of consumers in each region does not aﬀect its TFP or amenity; it is
exclusively enjoyed by the agents located in each region. As the analysis in the present section demon-
strates, such an assumption turns out to be insuﬃcient for endogenously producing the polycentricity
of spatial agglomeration patterns.
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Preference. The utility function of a consumer in region i is defined as the following CES function:
ui({q ji})  ai ·
(∑
j∈K
q(σ−1)/σji
)σ/(σ−1)
, (C.12.1)
where q ji is the quantity of the good variety produced in region j ∈ K and consumed in region i. The
constant σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, and ai(hi) is the local amenity. The
local amenity deteriorates as the population hi in i increases; this is defined by the following power
function that produces a congestion eﬀect:
ai(hi)  a¯ih−βi , (C.12.2)
where a¯i > 0, β ≥ 0 is the exogenously given constants. In particular, a¯i represents the unobserved
amenity in region i. When β  0, there is no congestion eﬀect and the local amenity is the exogenous
constant a¯i .
The income of consumers comes only from the wage from production firms. We denote the price
of the variety produced in j and consumed in i as p ji . The wage in region i is denoted by wi ≥ 0.
Then, the budget constraint of a consumer in i is given by the following equation:
wi 
∑
j∈K
p jiq ji . (C.12.3)
To normalize the wage, we impose a constraint
∑
i∈K wihi W , which means that total income in the
economy always equals the fixed constantW .
The utility maximization of consumers under a given price system p yields
q ji 
p−σji
P1−σi
wi , (C.12.4)
where Pi is the price index of the good in region i:
Pi ≡
( ∑
k∈K
p1−σki
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.12.5)
Production. Firms in region i ∈ K produce goods under perfect competition. As a result, the final
price of the good produced in i and sold in j, which we denote by pi j , equals
pi j 
wi
mi
τi j , (C.12.6)
where mi denotes the TFP in region i. To model a Marshallian agglomeration economy (Marshall,
1989) in a reduced form, the TFP in region i is assumed to be an increasing power function of its
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population:
mi(hi)  m¯ihαi (C.12.7)
with m¯i > 0, α ≥ 0 being exogenous constants. If α  0, the TFP in region i is a given constant m¯i .
Short-run equilibrium. In the following, we set m¯i  1, a¯i  1 for all i to abstract from any first-
nature advantages. In the short run, consumers are immobile across regions. We determine short-run
indirect utility as a function of h under general equilibrium conditions, which consist of the PMCC
and the ZPC of firms. First, by plugging (C.12.6) and (C.12.7) into (C.12.5), with dki ≡ τ1−σki , we obtain
Pi 
( ∑
k∈K
w1−σk h
α(σ−1)
k dki
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.12.8)
The ZPC of firms requires that total revenue in region i is exhausted. This yields the wage equation
for the model:
wihi 
∑
j∈K
w1−σi h
α(σ−1)
i di j∑
k∈K w1−σk h
α(σ−1)
k dk j
w jh j . (C.12.9)
Given the short-run equilibrium wage w, the indirect utility function is given by
vi(h) 
h−βi wi
Pi
. (C.12.10)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Direct computation shows that the Jacobian matrix of
the payoﬀ function ∇v(h¯) is given by
∇v(h¯)  [σI − D¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 [ − (α + β − γ0)I + (α + β + γ1)D¯] , (C.12.11)
where γ0 ≡ 1+ασ and γ1 ≡ 1−βσ . Thus, we conclude that
∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯, (C.12.12)
with c0  −(α + β − γ0) and c1  α + β + γ1.
Numerical example. Figure 9 assumes Allen and Arkolakis (2014)’s model. The parameters are set
to α  0.5, β  0.3, σ  6, and H  10.
83
Ta
bl
e
2:
Ex
ac
tm
ap
pi
ng
so
fe
co
no
m
ic
ge
og
ra
ph
y
m
od
el
st
o
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
of
G
(f
)
c 0
+
c 1
f
+
c 2
f2
M
od
el
cl
as
s
Sp
ec
ifi
c
m
od
el
Lo
ca
lf
or
ce
G
lo
ba
lf
or
ce
s
c 0
c 1
c 2
C
la
ss
(i)
K
ru
gm
an
(1
99
1)
0
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−( µ2 σ−
1
+
1 σ
)
Pu
ga
(1
99
9)
0
µˇ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−( µˇ2 σ−
1
+
1 σ
+
ω
)
Fo
rs
lid
an
d
O
tta
vi
an
o
(2
00
3)
0
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−( µ
2
σ
(σ
−1
)+
1
)
Pfl
üg
er
(2
00
4)
0
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−µ σ
L+
H
H
H
ar
ris
an
d
W
ils
on
(1
97
8)
1
−
1 α
0
−1
C
la
ss
(ii
)
H
el
pm
an
(1
99
8)
−γ
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−( µ2 σ−
1
+
1 σ
) +γ
Re
dd
in
g
an
d
St
ur
m
(2
00
8)
−γ
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
) −γσ
−1 σ
0
M
ur
at
a
an
d
Th
is
se
(2
00
5)
−θˆ
(1
−θˆ
)( 1 σ−1
+
1 σ
) −θˆ
σ
−1 σ
0
A
lle
n
an
d
A
rk
ol
ak
is
(2
01
4)
−(
α
+
β)
+
1
+
α
σ
(α
+
β)
+
1
−β σ
0
Be
ck
m
an
n
(1
97
6)
−γ
1
0
C
la
ss
(ii
i)
Ta
bu
ch
i(
19
98
)
−γˆ
( 1 σ+σ
−1 σ
φ
)
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−( µ2 σ−
1
ω
0
+
1 σ
ω
1
)
Pfl
üg
er
an
d
Sü
de
ku
m
(2
00
8)
−γ
H
L+
H
µ
( 1 σ−1+
1 σ
)
−µ σ
L+
H
H
Ta
ka
ya
m
a
an
d
A
ka
m
at
su
(2
01
1)
−γ
1
−µ
L H
N
ot
e:
Th
e
po
si
tiv
e
(n
eg
at
iv
e)
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
in
di
ca
te
ag
gl
om
er
at
io
n
(d
is
pe
rs
io
n)
fo
rc
es
.
O
bs
er
ve
th
at
cl
as
s
(i)
m
od
el
s
in
co
rp
or
at
e
a
gl
ob
al
di
sp
er
si
on
fo
rc
e,
cl
as
s(
ii)
m
od
el
si
nc
lu
de
a
lo
ca
lo
ne
,a
nd
cl
as
s(
iii
)m
od
el
sc
om
pr
is
e
bo
th
fo
rc
es
.S
ee
th
e
an
al
ys
es
ab
ov
e
fo
rt
he
de
riv
at
io
ns
an
d
de
fin
iti
on
so
ft
he
pa
ra
m
et
er
s.
Th
e
m
od
el
of
M
os
sa
y
an
d
Pi
ca
rd
(2
01
1)
(a
nd
he
nc
e
Bl
an
ch
et
et
al
.(
20
16
))
is
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
of
Be
ck
m
an
n
(1
97
6)
.
84
D Comparative statics: Role of local factors
The majority of structural exercises in the current stream of quantitative spatial economics employ
local unobserved factors (i.e., heterogeneities in local amenities or the productivity of firms) to
replicate the actual data, often under conditions where the uniqueness of the equilibrium is ensured
(Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). For example, in the simplest form, structural residuals under
fixed values of the main exogenous parameters of the model (e.g., the expenditure share of the
manufactured goods µ or the elasticity of substitution σ) are given broad interpretations such as
recovered “local amenities” and then used as exogenous parameters to conduct the counterfactual
analyses. In this section, we explore the implications of such approaches by carrying out simple
comparative static analyses.
D.1 Structure of equilibrium spatial patterns with location-fixed factors
The payoﬀ function of an economic geographymodel can be written as vi(h,A), whereA ≡ (Ai)i∈K is
the vector of the location-fixed factors. Two canonical examples show how such location-fixed factors
are modeled in the literature.
The first and perhaps simplest example is a location-fixed factor in the payoﬀ function:
vi(h,Ai)  vˆi(h) + Ai , (D.1.1)
where vˆi(h) is the A-independent component of vi(h,Ai), which we term local heterogeneity. The
specification (D.1.1) includes manymodels with location-fixed factors that directly aﬀect the (indirect)
utility of mobile workers. For instance, by taking the logarithm, the indirect utility function of Allen
and Arkolakis (2014)’s model that incorporates location-fixed amenities reduces to (D.1.1). Such
eﬀects also arise from local non-tradable goods, with a representative example beingHelpman (1998).
As is evident from (C.4.11), when we let Ai : (1 − µ) log[Ai], the model reduces to (D.1.1).
The second and more involved example is those location-fixed factors that aﬀect interregional
trade flows, which we term global heterogeneity. The regional model of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg
(2017), §3, is an example. Owing to heterogeneities in the local productivity of firms Ai , The prices
of manufactured goods diﬀer across regions; then, the trade balance implies that the wage in region
i depends on the whole pattern of A. Thus, vi(h,A) is (with slight notational abuse)
vi(h,A)  vi(h,w(h,A)), (D.1.2)
where w(h,A)  (wi(h,A)) denotes the wage vector. Krugman (1991)’s model is also an exam-
ple, where one may interpret that Ai represents the number of immobile workers in region i or,
alternatively, the region-specific productivity (as in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), §3).
We have seen that by assuming a racetrack economy and abstracting from the first-nature advan-
tages as well as by letting A  A¯ ≡ A¯1, the flat-earth equilibrium h¯ ≡ h1 is always an equilibrium.
The question asked in the present appendix is as follows: What happens when we consider variation in
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the spatial pattern of the location-fixed factors? Does our classification obtained under no heterogeneities still
matter?
Suppose that h¯ is the unique stable equilibrium. Then, we may view that the equilibrium spatial
pattern is a function of A so that h  h(A). In the vicinity of h¯, we have
h(A)  h(A¯ + δ) ≈ h¯ + JAδ, (D.1.3)
where δ  (δi) ≡ A − A¯  (Ai − A¯) is the variation in A and JA ≡ [∂hi/∂A j] is the Jacobian matrix of
the spatial pattern of mobile agents with respect toA evaluated at A¯. We also define ϵ by
ϵ ≡ δ⊤(h − h¯)  δ⊤JAδ. (D.1.4)
If ϵ 
∑
i∈K δi(hi − h¯) ≥ 0 for any imposed non-zero variation δ in the location-fixed factors, we have
δi(hi − h¯)  (Ai − A¯)(hi − h¯) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ K . This fact implies the following lemma.
LemmaD.1. Assume that JA  [∂hi/∂Ai] is positive definite atA  A¯ and consider a small variation
δ  (δi) , 0 in A such that A  A¯ + δ. Then, the sign of the variation in the location-fixed factor of
region i, δi  Ai − A¯, and that of the marginal increase in its population, hi − h, coincide.
The above lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for any economic geography model under which an
increase of the location-fixed factor Ai implies population growth in region i and vice versa.
To employ Lemma D.1, we should evaluate JA. Below, we show that this is represented by the
Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function. First, recall that an interior equilibrium with hi > 0 for all i
must be a solution to the following system of non-linear equations:
v(h,A) − v¯(h,A)1  0, (D.1.5)
where v¯(h,A) ≡ H−1∑i∈K vi(h,A)hi denotes the average payoﬀ. The implicit function theorem
regarding the equilibrium equation (D.1.5) implies that at (h¯, A¯), JA is evaluated as follows:
JA  [cE − (I −E)J]−1[I −E]Jˆ , (D.1.6)
where c ≡ h−1 v¯,E ≡ K−111⊤ is amatrixwhose elements are all 1/K, J ≡ [∂vi/∂hi], and Jˆ ≡ [∂vi/∂Ai].
All matrices are evaluated at the flat-earth pattern (h¯, A¯).
Since JA is symmetric at the flat-earth equilibrium, it is positive definite if and only if its eigen-
values are all positive. However, because JA is circulant, its eigenvalues are computable by adopting
the same procedure as in our stability analysis (Lemma B.2). We conclude that the eigenvalues ak of
JA are given by63
ak 

0, k  0,
−e−1k eˆk , k  1, 2, . . . , K − 1,
(D.1.7)
63We note that I −E andE represent the projections onto the subspace of RK defined by∑i∈K xi  0 and its
orthogonal subspace, respectively, and their eigenvalues are (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1) and (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
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with ek and eˆk being the kth eigenvalues of J and Jˆ , respectively, where we assume that ek , 0.
Moreover, the eigenvectors of JA are again {ηk} with ηk  (cos[θki]) with k  0, 1, . . . , K − 1. Note
that we have a0  0. This is intuitive because it says that a uniform increase in Ai across the regions
does not aﬀect the spatial pattern—in otherwords, whatmatters is the relative variation in the location-
fixed factors. Thus, without loss of generality, we rewrite δ 
∑
k∈K Ckηk and assume C0  0, meaning
that δ · 1  0. We then have h − h¯  ∑k∈K Ckakηk and
ϵ  δ⊤(h − h¯) 
∑
k∈K
C2kak . (D.1.8)
If ak > 0 for all k ≥ 1, we have ϵ > 0. Each ak is an amplifying factor in the direction of ηk in the sense
that if δ  ηk , we obtain h − h¯  akηk .
That said, we have two questions regarding the properties of ak . The first is obvious:
Question 1. Is ak > 0 for all k ≥ 1?
If true, from LemmaD.1, this implies that the relative advantage of a region implies a relative increase
in its population and vice versa. As we see below, this is generally the case.
The second is important: What happens on {ak} if we face a change (in particular, a decrease) in transport
costs? Put another way, does an increase in trade freeness r (see Section B.2) imply a strengthened
role of first natures—or the converse? In concrete terms:
Question 2. Is dak/dr positive (or negative) for all k ≥ 1?
We see that because
dϵ
dr

∑
i∈K
C2k
dak
dr
, (D.1.9)
if dak/dr happened to be positive for all k ≥ 1, as r increases (τ decreases), the location-fixed factors
matter more; the converse is also true.
D.2 Role of location-fixed factors: Model class matters
For simplicity, consider the simplest case, (local heterogeneity), as in (D.1.1). We note that for (D.1.1),
we have Jˆ  I and thus eˆk  1, which in turn implies that ak  −e−1k . Recalling that if the flat-earth
equilibrium is stable, we have ek < 0 for all k, we see that ak > 0. Thus, it must be that ϵ > 0 for
any relative variation δ in A. Thus, the answer to the first question is “yes”: any relative first-nature
(dis)advantage in terms of location-fixed amenities increases (decreases) the local population when
the flat-earth equilibrium is stable—this is, of course, hardly a surprise.
We next turn our attention to the second question. As we see, asking the question reveals a major
watershed between model classes (i) and (ii): when the economy faces a decrease in transport costs, the
eﬀects of location-fixed advantages are typically in the opposite direction for classes (i) and (ii).
For the class (i) models in the literature, there is a determinate implication regarding the eﬀects of
a decline in interregional transport costs on first-nature advantages. As long as the flat-earth pattern
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is stable, we have64
dak
dr
> 0. (D.2.1)
Thus, the positive eﬀects of the relative location-fixed advantages increase according to the decrease in inter-
regional transport costs. Under the stability of the flat-earth equilibrium, a decrease in interregional
transport costs fosters more agglomeration in regions with relative advantages in amenity. In fact,
this leads to the instability of the flat-earth equilibrium because at the first break point, we have ek  0
for some k and hence ak  ∞ for that k. Thus, the model leads to regional divergence, even in the
range of transport costs where the flat-earth equilibrium is stable.
For class (ii) models, a decrease in transport costs has the opposite implication compared with class (i)
models. We illustrate this by using Helpman (1998)’s model. For the original model with PL, we have
dak
dr
< 0 (D.2.2)
whenever the stability of the flat-earth equilibrium is ensured regardless of the level of r, by the
condition σ(1 − µ) > 1. Thus, regions once flourished by first-nature advantages due to larger en-
dowments of housing space will decline if interregional transport costs decrease. Assuming diﬀerent
specifications of the local factors as in (D.1.2) does not alter the result. In fact, as we see, if we consider
a variant model where A is interpreted as the heterogeneities in local productivity as in the regional
model of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), §3 (see Section C.4), we have the same result: ak > 0
and that dak/dr < 0; this result is also consistent with the numerical exercise conducted by the study.
In short, in class (ii) models, the role of initial heterogeneity declines in line with decreasing transport
costs.
The interpretation of the behavior of class (ii) models is straightforward. As the role of in-
terregional transport costs declines, the local dispersion force dominates. Then, an agglomeration
formed solely by its local advantages must face relative second-nature disadvantages because of local
congestion compared with those formerly behind, leading to a relative decline in such a region.
In light of this, assumptions about landownership can aﬀect the sign of dak/dr. In particular, LL,
by redistributing local rental revenue, can relax the magnitude of the second-nature disadvantage in
regions in which housing rent is high. If the expenditure share of the housing good is suﬃciently
high, via redistribution, this can overcome any relative second-nature disadvantage, meaning that
64For all class (i)models in the literature, wehave ek  G( fk(r))/φ( fk(r))with a strictly positive anddecreasing
function φ( f ) (see Appendix C). Noting that d fk/dr < 0, this then implies that
dak
dr
 −de
−1
k
dr
 − d
dr
(
φ( fk(r))
G( fk(r))
)
 −φ
′( fk)G( fk) − φ( fk)G′( fk)
{G( fk)}2
d fk
dr
> 0,
where we note that φ′( fk)G( fk) − φ( fk)G′( fk) is strictly positive since φ′( fk) < 0, φ( fk) > 0, and because the
flat-earth equilibrium is stable G( fk) < 0 and G′( fk) < 0.
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dak/dr > 0. If we assume LL in Helpman (1998) as in Redding and Sturm (2008), we obtain
dak
dr

< 0, if µ¯ < µ < 1,
> 0, if 0 < µ < µ¯,
(D.2.3)
with µ¯ ≡ 2(σ−1)2
2σ2−2σ+1 <
σ−1
σ , which confirms the above speculation. This result illustrates the basic role
of a local dispersion force and typically less featured assumptions on landownership.
Thus, whether the second-nature causation of an economic geography model boosts first-nature
advantages in line with decreasing transport costs or not depends on the model class to which it
belongs.
Below, in addition to the simplest case (D.1.1), we provide examples of global heterogeneity where
the payoﬀ is given by (D.1.2). For this case, we have ∇Av  ∇wv∇Aw. Because ak (k ≥ 1) is the kth
eigenvalue of (∇hv)−1(∇Av), we first evaluate the two matrices and then their product. Given any
wage equationW (h,w,A)  0 that incorporates local factorsA, we have the following computation:
∇hv  {φ(D¯)}−1GH(D¯), ∇Av  {φ(D¯)}−1GA(D¯), (D.2.4)
where we define the matrix polynomials φ, GH, and GA of D¯ by
φ(D¯) ≡ (∇wW )−1 , GH(D¯) ≡ ∇hv∇wW − ∇wv∇hW , GA(D¯) ≡ ∇Av∇wW − ∇wv∇AW . (D.2.5)
By employing these formula, we see ek  GH( fk)/φ( fk) and eˆk  GA( fk)/φ( fk), meaning that we have
a0  0, and, for k ≥ 1,
ak  −GA( fk)GH( fk) . (D.2.6)
This in turn implies
dak
dr
 −G
′
A( fk)GH( fk) − GA( fk)G′H( fk)
{GH( fk)}2
d fk
dr
. (D.2.7)
However, since we have d fk/dr < 0, we conclude
sgn
dak
dr
 sgn
[
G′A( fk)GH( fk) − GA( fk)G′H( fk)
]
. (D.2.8)
Basically, location-fixed factors that aﬀect trade flows can be modeled by employing either of the
two forms in the following examples. These two examples demonstrate that the above implication,
namely model class matters even when uniqueness is the case, holds true for the cases when the level of
the location-fixed factors in a region aﬀects the nominal wages in other regions.
Example D.1 (Heterogeneous local productivity (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, §3)). The pro-
ductivity of firms diﬀers across regions and thus aﬀects the regional share in trade flows. The wage
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equation for the model is defined by (C.4.19):
Wi(h,w,A)  wihi −
∑
j∈K
hiAiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkAkw1−σk dk j
w jh j  0. (D.2.9)
Without heterogeneities in the per capita housing space, the indirect utility function is
vi 
µ
σ − 1 ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi] − (1 − µ) ln[hi] (D.2.10)
with ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K h jAiw1−σj d ji . By employing these formulae, we compute as follows:
∇hv  1h
(
µ
σ − 1D¯ − (1 − µ)I
)
, ∇wv  1w¯ µ(I − D¯), ∇Av 
1
A
µ
σ − 1D¯, (D.2.11)
∇hW  −w¯D¯(I − D¯), ∇wW  h{σI − (σ − 1)D¯}(I + D¯), ∇AW  − 1Aw¯h(I − D¯)(I + D¯). (D.2.12)
These formulae imply that without heterogeneities in the per capita housing space, we have
GH( f )  1σ (1 − f )
[
− (1 − µ) +
( µσ
σ − 1 −
σ − 1
σ
)
f
]
(D.2.13)
GA( f )  − hA
µ
σ − 1 (1 − f )
[(σ − 1) + σ f ] < 0. (D.2.14)
By employing these formulae, we can show that whenever the equilibrium is unique (σ(1 − µ) > 1),
we have GH( f ) < 0 and thus ak ≥ 0 for all k. It also follows that dak/dr < 0 for all k ≥ 1. We also
note that GH( f ) < 0 implies the stability of h¯. Further, if there are no exogenous heterogeneities inA,
the model is isomorphic to Redding and Sturm (2008) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) regarding the
second-nature mechanism.
ExampleD.2 (Heterogeneous local market size (Krugman, 1991)). Consider Krugman (1991)’smodel.
Assuming there are first-nature heterogeneities in the local endowments of immobile agents, we can
model the heterogeneities in market size. For the model, the wage equation is
Wi(h,w,A)  wihi − µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(wihi + Ai)  0, (D.2.15)
where Ai is the number of immobile workers in region i. We compute as follows:
∇hv  1h
µ
σ − 1D¯, ∇wv 
1
w¯
(I − µD¯), ∇Av  0, (D.2.16)
∇hW  −w¯D¯(µI − D¯), ∇wW  h{σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2}, ∇AW  −µD¯. (D.2.17)
Then, we have
GH( f )  1σ
[ ( µ
σ − 1 +
µ
σ
)
f −
(
µ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
f 2
]
, (D.2.18)
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GA( f )  µw¯ f (1 − µ f ) > 0. (D.2.19)
By employing these formulae, we can show that ak ≥ 0 for all k and that dak/dr > 0 for all k ≥ 1
whenever the flat-earth equilibrium is stable (i.e., GH( f ) < 0).
Remark D.1. Some models, e.g., Redding and Turner (2015), §20.3, employ both local and global
heterogeneities such that
vi(h,A,B)  vi(h,w(h,A)) + Bi , (D.2.20)
where A  (Ai) and B  (Bi) are exogenous constants that reflect global and local heterogeneities,
respectively. Since A and B are not related to each other, the Jacobian matrix with respect to these
two heterogeneities is given by a block-diagonal form and the eﬀects of each heterogeneity can be
studied separately.
D.3 Numerical examples
This section provides numerical examples to complement the above formal analysis, which focused
on infinitesimally small variations in A. Below, by focusing on the most canonical form of the
location-fixed factors as in (D.1.1), we add an extra positive constant term A0 to the indirect utility of
region 0, meaning that the region has an exogenous advantage. Our numerical results suggest that
the drawn formal conclusions correctly predict the tendency in agglomeration patterns even when a
strong location-fixed eﬀect is imposed.
Figure 16 andFigure 17 report the results of our numerical experiments under three representative
settings, namely a class (ii)model under the uniqueness of the equilibrium and class (i) and (ii)models
under amultiplicity of equilibria. In linewith the numerical examples discussed in Section 5 (Figure 8,
and Figure 9), Krugman (1991) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) are employed for the examples for
classes (i) and (ii), respectively. We note that the latter is isomorphic to Helpman (1998) with LL (i.e.,
Redding and Sturm, 2008; Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
The figures show the population share of region 0 at stable equilibria, λ0 ≡ hi/H, against τ for
the four settings of A0 in {0, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01}. A0  0 is the baseline case with no location-fixed
advantage. Under our parameter setting, A0 accounts for 0.5 ∼ 100% of the indirect utility of region 0
and hence has significant eﬀects on the equilibrium patterns.
Figure 16 reports the evolutionary paths of λ0 for the model proposed by Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) [class (ii)] under the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The parameters are the same as in Figure 9
except that we let β  0.6. This implies α + β ≤ 0 and hence the equilibrium is unique regardless of
the level of transport costs (see Section 5.2). Compared with the baseline case A0  0, λ0 is larger
for the other cases (A0  0.001, 0.005, 0.01); this corresponds to the condition ak > 0. In addition, λ0
is increasing in A0, which is intuitive. Furthermore, λ0 decreases in line with τ, which is consistent
with dak/dr < 0.
Figure 17 reports the evolutionary paths of λ0 for the models proposed by Krugman (1991) [class
(i)] and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) [class (ii)] under a multiplicity of equilibria. The basic model
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Figure 16: Population share of region 0 under the uniqueness of the equilibrium [Allen and Arkolakis
(2014)’s model]
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Figure 17: Population share of region 0 under a multiplicity of equilibria
parameters other than A0 are the same as in Figure 8 and Figure 9. We confirm that the figures are
also consistent with our predictions: that (a) ak > 0 and that (b) dak/dr > 0 for the class (i) models
and dak/dr < 0 for the class (ii) models, provided that h¯ is stable. For all A0  0.001, 0.005, 0.01, λ0 is
greater than that for A0  0, which confirms ak > 0. Moreover, by focusing on the ranges τ ∈ (τ∗ ,∞)
(for Panel A) and τ ∈ (0, τ∗∗) (for Panel B), the curves confirm (b). Although our predictions do not
cover τ ∈ (0, τ∗) for Panel A, a similar relation robustly holds true: as long as the global structure
of the spatial pattern is unchanged (i.e., bifurcation is not encountered), a monotonic decrease in τ
implies a greater role of location-fixed advantages in region 0.
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